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1. Introduction: 
Islamic finance is the only example of a financial system directly based on the 
ethical precepts of a major religion, providing not only investment guidelines but 
also a set of unique investment and financing products.” Islamic finance is based 
on Shari'a, the Islamic law that provides guidelines for multiple aspects of Muslim 
life, including religion, politics, economics, banking, business and aspects of the 
legal system What shari‘a compliant financing (SCF) seeks to do is to shape 
financial practices and accompanying legal instruments that conform to Islamic 
law. Major financial principles of shari‘a include a ban on interest, a ban on 
uncertainty, adherence to risk-sharing and profit-sharing, promotion of ethical 
investments that enhance society and do not violate practices banned in the 
Qur’an and tangible asset-backing. 
Money, according to Islamic teachings is a measure of value, not a commodity. 
Debt is a relationship in which risk and responsibility are shared by all parties to a 
contract. Money must be put to practical use in creating real value for the 
participants of the transaction. It must be used to create, and not be a 
commodity in on and of itself. It because of this that the perception of hoarding 
capital, and the earning of a passive return on capital keyed to the passage of 
time, -i.e. interest – is prohibited. In short, money must not be made from money. 
The establishment of modern Islamic financial institutions started three decades 
ago. Currently, there are at least 70 countries that have some form of 
Islamic financial services; almost all major multinational banks are offering these 
services. The underlying financial principles in Islamic finance have remained 
unchanged historically since their development over 1,400 years ago. Financial 
products must be certified as Sharia compliant by an expert in Islamic law. 
Certification requires that the transaction adheres to a  number of key principles 
that include: 
● Backing by a tangible asset, usufruct or services, so as to avoid ‘speculation’ 
(gharar). Prohibition of interest payments (riba). 
● Risk to be shared amongst participants. 
● Limitations on sale of financial assets and their use as collateral. 
● Prohibition of finance for activities deemed incompatible with sharia law 
(haram), such as alcohol, conventional financial services, gambling and tobacco. 
Modern Islamic finance emerged in the mid-1970s with the founding of the 
first large Islamic banks. Development initially occurred through marketing of 
a steadily expanding supply of Sharia compliant financial instruments. 
This supply-driven model contributed to relatively slow growth until the mid-
1990s, since when demand has increasingly driven 
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the development of Islamic financial instruments.  Rising awareness and demand 
for Islamic products, along with supportive government policies and growing 
sophistication of financial institutions, have together raised the rate of 
growth. 
Two developments have been critical to the expansion of Islamic financial markets. 
In 1998, the so-called “Dow Jones Islamic Indexes fatwa” played a 
transformative role because it opened the door to a limited degree of “permissible 
impurity” in financial transactions and institutionalized a notion of cleansing and 
purification whereby small amounts of impermissible interest income could 
be cleansed or purified by donation to charity. In turn, this led to a series of 
equity investment tests that could be used to evaluate potential investments for 
shari‘a  compliance. A second critical innovation was the introduction of sukuk 
– a shari‘a compliant substitute for bonds – where capital protection is achieved 
not as a loan but as a binding agreement by the issuer to repurchase certain 
assets over a period of time. 
Sukuk has now become one of the backbones of Islamic capital markets and has 
enabled the rapid growth of Islamic financial transactions. 
While the Islamic finance industry represents a fraction of the global finance 
market, it has grown at double-digit rates in recent years. By some  estimates, total  
assets held  globally under Islamic finance reached $1 trillion in 2010. Islamic 
banks have appeared to be more resilient than conventional banks to the 
immediate effects of the international financial crisis and global economic 
downturn. Some analysts have attributed this to Islamic banks’ avoidance of 
speculative activities. However, the Islamic finance industry has not been 
completely immune to the general decline in demand  and  investor  uncertainty. 
Global issuance of Islamic capital market securities (sukuk), a fast- growing 
segment of the Islamic finance industry, peaked in 2007 at $35 billion, declined 
to $15 billion in 2008 and then rose to $20 billion in 2009. with Zawya Sukuk 
Monitor reporting a 64% increase in sukuk issuance to $138bn in 2012 from $84bn 
in the previous year. This follows a recovery from a low point of $20bn in 2008. 
Sukuk made a strong start to 2013 with $59bn of issuance in the first half 
of the year. 
TheCityUK estimates that the global market for Islamic financial services,as  
measured  by  Sharia  compliant  assets,  reached 
$1,460bn at the end of 2012, up a fifth on the previous year. This means that global 
assets of Islamic finance have doubled since the start of the economic 
slowdown. The industry is set to grow significantly in the years ahead. At the 
current rate of growth of around 20% per year, the market could top $2 trillion in 
assets by the end of 2014. 
Assets that can be allocated to individual countries from The Banker’s survey 
reveals that the leading countries for Sharia compliant assets are Iran which 
accounts for around 36% of the global market, Malaysia (17%) and Saudi Arabia 
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(14%). These are followed by other Gulf states including UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain 
and Qatar, and then  Turkey.The  UK, in ninth place, is the leading Western 
country with $19bn of reported assets.There are over 700 institutions registered 
globally as sharia-compliant organisations in financial services. Of these, 
around 500 are fully compliant, and the  remainder  operate  sharia-compliant 
products within a conventional institution. Countries with most of the 430 firms 
reporting to The Banker’s survey include Bahrain and Indonesia with 74 and 71 
firms respectively. Malaysia, Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were in a group of 
countries with more than 50 firms. 
 
The multiple reasons for the growth of the Islamic financial sector in recent 
years: 
(1) The flow of funds into Muslim oil-producing states; 
(2) Growing political and social desire in the Muslim world for financial 
alternatives to banking and investment institutions that have been 
historically dominated by the West; 
(3) The spreading credit crisis in global financial markets and the need to 
access new sources of investment capital; 
(4) The growth of sovereign wealth funds and the desire to have shari‘a 
compliant instruments through which to invest them; and, 
(5) The rapidly accelerating number of cross-border multi- jurisdictional 
financial transactions that are possible and required in a globalized world 
economy Assets held by Muslim investors worldwide now exceed $1.6 
trillion, and that amount is expected to grow to $2.7 trillion by 2010. 
shari‘a compliant finance has become an accepted and vibrant 
element in international financial transactions. It offers a  fresh  opportunity  to  
emphasize  the  moral  and  ethical aspects of business and finance that 
reaches beyond the Arab and Islamic worlds to prompt a reexamination 
of the core  values  underlying  all  global  financial  transactions  – making 
available the financial resources needed to develop the  human  capital  that  
will  sustain  economic  and  social progress. The main principles of Islamic 
finance include:  
(1)The prohibition of taking or receiving interest; 
(2) Capital must have a social and ethical purpose beyond pure,unfettered 
return; 
(3) Investments in businesses dealing with alcohol, gambling, drugs or anything 
else that the shari‘a considers unlawful are deemed undesirable and 
prohibited; 
(4)A prohibition on transactions involving maysir (speculation or gambling); 
and 
9  
  
(5)A prohibition on gharar, or uncertainty about the subject- matter and terms 
of contracts – this includes a prohibition on selling something that one does 
not own. 
Because of the restriction on interest-earning investments, Islamic banks must 
obtain their earnings through profit-sharing investments or fee-based returns. 
When loans are given for business purposes, the lender, if he wants to make a 
legitimate gain under the shari‘a, should take part in the risk. If a lender does not 
take part in the risk, his receipt of any gain over the amount loaned is classed 
as interest. Islamic financial institutions also have the flexibility to engage in 
leasing transactions, including leasing transactions with purchase options. 
It may be asked why non-Muslims would agree to use Islamic finance structures. 
The principal answer is that Islamic finance provides an opportunity to tap into the 
significant funds of Islamic investors seeking shari‘a compliant investments. In 
addition, Islamic finance can be  combined  with  conventional  funding sources 
and export credit agency (ECA) support. 
Good governance is crucial to the ability of a business to  protect the interests 
of its stakeholders. These interests may extend beyond the purely financial to the 
stakeholders’ ethical, religious, or other values. In the case of an institution 
offering Islamic financial services, stakeholders expect its operations to be carried 
out in compliance with the principles of shari‘a (Islamic Law). A corporate 
structure that enables such an institution to implement good governance 
through shari‘a -compliant operations is therefore essential. 
As the Islamic finance industry develops further, there is a growing need for 
standardisation and professionalism across the industry. Coupled with this is the 
importance of adopting robust corporate governance systems of internationally 
recognised standards incorporating transparent, fair and ethical working practices. 
Islamic financial institutions are well-placed in this context, since at the heart of 
Islamic law is a vision of social development which requires all individuals and 
businesses to conduct themselves ethically and in a socially responsible manner. 
The Guiding Principles demonstrate how closely aligned are the basic principles 
of corporate governance with shari‘a rules and doctrines, and consequently how 
IFIs are well-placed to  offer shareholders opportunities to participate in a 
broader goal of corporate social responsibility. The design of a corporate 
governance system in Islamic economic system entails implementation of a 
rule-based incentive system such that the compliance with the rules ensures an 
efficient governance system to preserve social justice and order among all members 
of society. This would imply the design of institutions and rules that induce or, 
if needed, compel managers to internalize the welfare of all stakeholders. The 
rights that are claimed for stakeholders are not ends in themselves-- which ought 
to be recognized in any form of economic organization--but means for protecting 
constituency rights. In an Islamic system the observance of rules of behavior 
guarantees internationalization of stakeholder rights (including those of the society 
at large). No other institutional structure would be needed if there were complete 
adherence to Islamic rules. However, to ensure compliance to the Islamic rules, 
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there is need for institutional arrangements. Therefore, it would be the Islamic 
government that should specify appropriate corporate governance structure, 
“incorporating all stakeholders’ rights into fiduciary duties of managers” of the firm 
on behalf of none-- investors or stakeholders. So no other institutional 
arrangement that would allow individual non-investor stakeholders to negotiate 
directly with the firm would be necessary. Incorporating all stakeholders’ right 
into fiduciary duties of managers would be counter-productive and would lead 
to suboptimal results. The important point is that each stakeholder is given 
freedom of bargaining to protect its rights and there are systematic institutional 
arrangements in place to provide protection and to  mediate where disputes and 
disagreements arise. 
Institutional arrangements can be part of system-wide infrastructure surrounding 
the governance structure of the  firm. For example, because contracts are 
invariably incomplete, judicial interpretations can fill in the gaps. It is permissible 
to regard employment law, consumer law, tort law, as well as judicial rulings and 
administrative regulations, as part of the contracts that various stakeholders have 
with the firm. Similarly, the concept of shari‘a boards is very unique to Islamic 
financial system. A shari‘a board, consisting of fuqaha’ (scholars in shari‘a 
matters) has been used to oversea the operation of a financial institution to 
ensure that the operations and code of conduct of Islamic bank is according to 
the rules of shari‘a . A shari‘a board for every firm, which is seen in present 
architecture of Islamic banking, is not efficient whereas only one set of rules is 
needed for appropriate corporate governance based on the shari‘a for all firms. 
The same idea of shari‘a board can be extended to a system-level board 
consisting of scholars from different disciplines including shari‘a , economics, 
finance, and commercial  law,  to  ensure  that  rules  are  defined  and enforced 
so that economic agents fully comply with contractual obligations to all the 
stakeholders. 
This book reviews IIFS’ corporate governance (CG) challenges and suggests 
options to address them. Four main concerns motivate this attention to the CG of 
IIFS: 
1. CG is important for economic development;  
2. the assets of IIFS are significant and growing, 
3.  sound CG may be more critical for financial than other organizations, 
and  
4. the CG vulnerabilities of IIFS may not have received adequate 
attention in conventional CG frameworks 
This book is one of few papers that highlight the  importance of studying  
corporate governance for institutions offering Islamic financial services. The 
book is of value in describing governance in Islamic institutions and how there 
are many issues under the investigation process, especially issues related to 
the shari‘a Supervisory board and its functionality.One of the objectives of 
this paper is to discuss, and create greater awareness of, some of the crucial 
issues related to corporate governance in Islamic financial institutions. A 
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second, but in fact more important, objective is to provide, in the light of this 
discussion, certain essential guidelines to improve corporate governance in 
these institutions and thereby enable them to not only maintain their 
momentum of growth and international acceptance but also safeguard the 
interests of all stakeholders. The paper gives particular attention to the 
mechanisms for corporate governance, including the Board of Directors, 
Senior Management, shareholders, depositors, and regulatory and supervisory 
authorities. It also focuses on the effective management of risks and, in 
particular, on creating a supporting environment through moral uplift, social, 
legal and institutional checks, greater transparency, internal controls, and 
Shari'a as well as external audit. The paper also indicates briefly the shared 
institutions that are needed for effective corporate governance. 
 
II. Fundamentals of the Islamic finance 
 
One of the most important objectives of Islam is to realize greater justice in 
human society. According to the Qur’an all the messengers of God were sent to 
promote justice and any society where there is no justice will ultimately head 
towards decline and  destruction. One  of the  essential requisites for ensuring 
justice is a set of rules or moral values, which everyone accepts and complies with 
faithfully. The financial system may be able to promote justice if, in addition 
to being strong and 
stable, it satisfies at least two conditions. One of these is that the financier should 
also share in the risk so as not to shift the entire burden of losses to the entrepreneur 
or the borrower, and the other is that an equitable share of the society’s financial 
resources becomes available to even the poor on affordable terms in keeping 
with their ability to repay so as to enable them to realize their dream of owning 
their own homes, pursuing higher education and vocational training, and 
establishing their own micro enterprises. 
To fulfill the first condition of justice, Islam requires both the financier and 
the entrepreneur to equitably share the profit as well as the loss. For this purpose, 
one of the basic principles of Islamic finance is: “No risk, no gain.” This should 
help introduce greater discipline into the financial system by motivating 
financial institutions to assess the risks more carefully and to effectively monitor 
the use of funds by borrowers. The double assessment of risks by both the 
financier and the entrepreneur should help inject greater discipline into the 
system, and go a long way in not only increasing efficiency in the use of resources 
but also reducing excessive lending. 
Islamic finance is based on shari‘a , an Arabic term that is often translated into 
“Islamic law”. shari‘a provides guidelines for aspects of Muslim life, including 
religion, politics, economics, banking, business, and law. shari‘a -compliant 
financing (SCF) constitutes financial practices that conform to Islamic law. 
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Islamic finance was practiced predominantly in the Muslim world throughout the 
Middle Ages, fostering trade and business activities with the development of 
credit. In Spain and the Mediterranean and Baltic states, Islamic merchants 
became indispensable middlemen for trading activities. In fact, many concepts, 
techniques, and instruments of Islamic finance were later adopted by European 
financiers and businessmen. 
In contrast, the term “Islamic financial system” is relatively new, appearing only 
in the mid-1980s. In fact, all the earlier references to commercial or mercantile 
activities conforming to Islamic principles were made under the umbrella of either 
“interest free” or “Islamic” banking. However, describing the Islamic financial 
system simply as “interest-free” does not provide a true picture of the system as 
a whole. Undoubtedly, prohibiting the receipt and payment of interest is the 
nucleus of the system, but it is supported by other principles of Islamic 
doctrine advocating risk sharing, individuals’ rights and duties, property rights, 
and the sanctity of contracts. 
Similarly, the Islamic financial system is not limited to banking but covers 
capital formation, capital markets, and all types of financial intermediation. 
Interpreting the system as “interest free” tends to create confusion. The 
philosophical foundation of an Islamic financial system goes beyond the 
interaction of factors of production and economic behavior. Whereas the 
conventional financial system focuses primarily on the economic and financial 
aspects of transactions, the Islamic system places equal emphasis on the ethical, 
moral, social, and religious dimensions, to enhance equality and fairness for the 
good of society as a whole. The system can be fully appreciated only in the context 
of Islam’s teachings on the work ethic, wealth distribution, social and economic 
justice, and the role of the state. 
The Islamic financial system is founded on the absolute prohibition of the 
payment or receipt of any predetermined, guaranteed rate of return. This closes 
the door to the concept of interest and precludes the use of debt-based instruments. 
The system encourages risk-sharing, promotes entrepreneurship, discourages 
speculative behavior, and emphasizes the sanctity of contracts. Modern Islamic 
finance has existed internationally since the 1970s. Currently, Islamic finance 
represents a small but growing segment of the global finance industry. In some 
countries, such as Iran and Pakistan, Islamic banks are the only mainstream 
financial institutions. In others, shari‘a -compliant financing (SCF) exists 
alongside conventional banking. Estimates vary of the total size of assets held 
internationally under Islamic finance, generally ranging from $800 billion to $1 
trillion, with growth rates of 10% to 15% annually over the past ten years. The 
Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia historically have been and continue to be the 
major centers for SCF. For oil producers  in  the  Gulf  region,  Islamic  
finance  may  offer investment opportunities for their growing revenues from 
oil exports. There also has been a growing awareness of and demand for 
Islamic-based financial products by Muslim consumers. In 2007, Iran was the 
largest market for Islamic finance, reportedly accounting for close to 40% of 
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shari‘a - compliant financial assets worldwide.6 However, according to some 
analysts, the reach of Iran’s Islamic finance market may be limited because of 
international sanctions. Following Iran, the largest Islamic finance markets in 
2007 were Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). 
Support for Islamic finance varies in the Middle East. In some countries, such as 
Libya and Morocco, Islamic banks are considered by some to be tied to Islamic 
political parties and consequently have been refused licenses. Other countries, 
including Jordan, Tunisia, and the Sudan, have been receptive to Islamic finance, 
viewing Islamic financial products as an opportunity for creating capital and 
fostering economic development. 
In recent years, SCF has expanded to other parts of the world. Islamic finance is 
growing in Europe and North America, areas in which Muslims are in the minority. 
In August 2004, the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority (FSA) 
approved a banking license for the Islamic Bank of Britain (IBB), the country’s 
first Islamic bank. The IBB would serve the consumer market with shari‘a -
compliant products. In March 2006, the FSA licensed the European Islamic 
Investment Bank as the United Kingdom’s first independent bank for shari‘a -
compliant investments. In 1999, the Dow Jones presented its first Islamic market 
index, which follows shari‘a -compliant stocks internationally. The Dow Jones 
maintains more than 70 indices in its Islamic series and is advised by an 
independent shari‘a Supervisory Board counsel. 
A. shari‘a  law defined 
 
 
shari‘a (or Islamic) law is meant to regulate all aspects of a Muslim's way of 
life. It is broadly divided into two sets of rules: one relates to the obligatory 
worship of God (ibadah) and the other relates to daily life outside the context of 
obligatory worship (muamalat), including commercial and financial  dealings. 
shari‘a is not a codified body of law. It consists of general rules and principles 
derived from the Qur'an (the Muslim holy book), the practices (sunnah) and 
sayings (ahadith) of the Prophet Mohammed (as discussed in further detail 
below). These general principles are capable of interpretation and development 
to address new issues or circumstances that arise from time to time. Indeed, the 
shari‘a has been supplemented by extensive Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) 
developed over centuries by different schools of thought (the madhaa'hib). The 
key point to note is that, while all the schools of thought agree on the fundamental  
shari‘a  principles enshrined in the Qur'an, sunnah and hadith, they sometimes hold 
differing views on their interpretation and application. 
B. Sources of shari‘a  law 
 
 
shari‘a law is derived from a number of primary and secondary sources. 
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1. Qur'an 
The Qur'an is a primary source of law and is believed by Muslims to contain the 
word of God as revealed to the Prophet Mohammed. Evidence found in other 
sources of shari‘a law is subject to the Qur'an. 
2. Sunnah 
Sunnah literally means "well known path". The Sunnah is a primary source 
of law and comprises traditional accounts of what the Prophet Mohammed said 
or did during his life 
Which have legal content. Sunnah also comprises the sayings of others tacitly 
approved by the Prophet's silence. 
3. Hadith 
A further primary source of law is the narrative record of sayings and actions of the 
Prophet Mohammed known as hadith (plural ahadith). The extent to which sunnah 
is derived or differentiated from ahadith depends on the context and school of 
thought being considered. 
4. Qiyas 
 
 
Qiyas represents the process of reasoning whereby the principles found in the 
Qur'an and sunnah are extended to new cases by analogy. 
5. Ijma 
Ijma represents the consensus of the Islamic community (whether at a local 
or global academic level) on a particular issue. 
6. Ijtihad 
Ijtihad is the interpretation and the opinion of Islamic jurists on a particular issue. 
Qiyas,ijma and ijtihad are all secondary sources of shari‘a  law. 
C. Issues relating to interpretation and application of  shari‘a law 
 
Since shari‘a law is not a single codified body of law and is open to 
interpretation, the opinions of shari‘a scholars may differ on the same question 
of shari‘a law depending on the school of thought to which particular scholars 
belong. In addition, scholars' views on questions of shari‘a law may change 
over time. This can lead to uncertainty and inconsistency of interpretation and 
application of shari‘a law across the Islamic world. 
1. Key shari‘a principles and prohibitions relevant to 
finance 
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There are a number of key shari‘a principles and prohibitions relevant to finance 
and commercial transactions which distinguish Islamic finance from the 
conventional forms. For completeness, it should be mentioned that there are two 
main branches within Islam: sunnism and shiaism. The majority of Muslims 
are sunni and the following is limited to the discussion of the general shari‘a 
principles relating to Islamic finance within sunni jurisprudence. The key 
shari‘a principles which underpin Islamic finance, and have led to the creation 
of a separate finance industry, are as follows: 
a) Prohibition on usury and interest (riba) 
Prohibition of interest. Prohibition of riba, a term literally meaning “an excess” 
and interpreted as “any unjustifiable increase of capital whether in loans or sales” 
is the central tenet of the system. More precisely, any positive, fixed, predetermined 
rate tied to the maturity and the amount of principal (i.e., guaranteed regardless 
of the performance of the investment) is considered riba and is prohibited. The 
general consensus among Islamic scholars is that riba covers not only 
Usury but also the charging of “interest” as widely practiced. This prohibition is 
based on arguments of social justice, equality, and property rights. Islam 
encourages the earning of profits but forbids the charging of interest because 
profits, determined ex post, symbolize successful entrepreneurship and 
creation of additional wealth whereas interest, determined ex ante, is a cost that is 
accrued irrespective of the outcome of business operations and may not 
create wealth if there are business losses. Social justice demands that 
borrowers and lenders share rewards as well as losses in an equitable fashion and 
that the process of wealth accumulation and distribution in the economy be fair 
and representative of true productivity. 
Under the shari‘a , it is not permissible to charge, pay or receive interest. The 
shari‘a does not recognize the time value of money and it is therefore not 
permissible to make money by lending it. Money must be used to create real 
economic value and it is only permissible to earn a return from investing money 
in permissible commercial activities which involve the financier or investor taking 
some commercial risk. This prohibition is the main driving force behind the 
development of the modern Islamic finance industry. Riba can take one of two 
forms: riba al- naseeyah and riba al-fadl. 
1- Riba al-naseeyah is the amount of excess received by a lender in addition 
to the capital amount lent. This type of riba is comparable to the traditional concept 
of interest in conventional lending 
activities. 
2- The second type, riba al-fadl, is excess compensation without any form of 
consideration in return. 
16  
  
In modern finance, riba al-fadl could be applicable to several exchange of 
commodities contracts. 
The idea is that when compensation is paid, it should be justified or be set against a 
specific activity and the return should also be associated with a specific risk. 
Therefore when parties exchange commodities of similar value and one party 
pays excessive compensation to the other party, this is 
Considered riba. 
b) Prohibition on realising a gain from speculation 
(mayseer) 
 
It is not permissible to earn a profit from speculation. Gambling is therefore not 
permitted under shari‘a . Any contracts or arrangements which involve 
speculation are also not permitted. That said, it is accepted under the shari‘a 
that there is an element of speculation in most commercial arrangements and, 
unlike the absolute prohibition of interest, it is a question of the degree of 
speculation involved and whether the intention behind the transaction is to realise 
a gain from some productive effort or purely speculation. 
The distinction between prohibited speculation and legitimate commercial 
speculation is not always clear in practice and there are examples where it can be 
difficult to distinguish between the two. For example, it is generally accepted that 
it is permissible to make an equity investment in a company  Engaging in a 
business activity that is permissible under the shari‘a with a view to realising 
future dividends and capital gains on the investment. There is of course a degree 
of commercial speculation involved about the future prospects of the company 
when an investor makes an equity investment, but whether such speculation is 
permissible or not would depend on the intention of the investor, i.e. was the 
intention to make a quick profit by speculating in the likely movement of the share 
price over a very short period of time (as is arguably the case with day trading), 
or was the decision made on the basis of careful evaluation of the company's past 
results and future prospects? 
At the other end of the spectrum, equity derivatives such as index-linked 
derivatives are generally viewed as unacceptable under shari‘a because they 
involve speculation on the movement of an equity index. 
c) No uncertainty (gharar) in commercial transactions 
 
Certainty of terms in any transaction is a key requirement under the shari‘a . Again, 
as with speculation, a degree of commercial uncertainty is acceptable but there must 
not be any uncertainty about the key terms of the transaction. For example, in a 
transaction for the sale of assets, the sale contract should set out a clear 
description of the assets being sold, the sale price and the time for delivering the 
assets to the purchaser. Similarly, 
17  
  
a leasing contract needs to set out clearly the assets which are being leased, the 
duration of the lease and the rent payable under the lease. One of the reasons that 
conventional insurance contracts are not considered permissible under the shari‘a 
is that there is no certainty as to when a claim will be paid, given that there is no 
way of knowing if and when the insured event will occur. In the context of 
modern day Islamic finance, key examples of gharar are: 
(a) Advising a customer to buy shares of a particular company that is the subject 
of a takeover bid, on the grounds that its share price can be expected to rise; 
(b) Buying a house, the price of which is to be specified in the future; 
(c) When the subject matter or specifications to a contract are unknown; and 
(d) Deferred payment under a contract where the deferment is for an unknown 
period. 
d) All activity must be for permitted purposes (halal) 
 
Muslims must not engage in (or derive any benefit from) activities which are 
prohibited under the shari‘a . It is therefore not permissible for Muslims to invest 
in businesses which engage in prohibited activities such as casinos, a breweries or 
a factories making pork products. It is also not permissible for Islamic banks 
to provide any financing to such businesses. However, a very strict 
interpretation of these rules would mean that Muslims would only be able to 
invest in a very limited number of businesses internationally. For example, it 
would not be permissible for Muslims to invest in a hotel that serve alcohol, a food 
company which also manufactures pork products as part of its product range or any 
business that lends or borrows money at interest. 
In light of the practical considerations of international commerce and in order to 
enable Muslim investors to participate in it, a number of prominent shari‘a  
scholars have advanced the view that it is permissible for Muslims to invest 
in businesses or companies which are not entirely shari‘a compliant so long as 
certain conditions are met. These conditions include (among other things): 
(a) The principal business activity must be permissible under shari‘a ; 
(b) Any income derived from prohibited activities should only form a small 
percentage of the overall income of the company or business (this percentage 
ranges from 5 to 20 per cent. Of overall income depending upon the nature 
of the prohibited activity and the shari‘a  scholars involved); 
(c) The aggregate amount of interest-bearing debt incurred by a company or 
business must not exceed a certain percentage of 
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its assets or market capitalisation (there are disagreements between shari‘a 
scholars as to what percentage is acceptable and it ranges from 25 to 35 per cent. 
of total assets or market capitalisation depending upon the scholars involved); and 
(d) The accounts receivable of the company on the business must not exceed 
a certain percentage of its assets or market capitalisation (usually set between 25 
and 33 per cent.). 
e) Making Money from Money is not Permissible 
One of the wrong presumptions on which all theories of interest are based is that 
money is a commodity. It is, therefore, argued that just as a merchant can sell his 
commodity for a higher price than his cost, he can also sell his money for a higher 
price than its face value, or just as he can lease his property and can charge 
a rent against it, he can also lend his money and can claim interest thereupon. 
Islamic principles, however, do not subscribe to this presumption. Money and  
commodity have different characteristics and, therefore, they are treated 
differently. 
The basic points of difference between money and commodity:- 
(a) Money has no intrinsic utility. It cannot be utilized in direct fulfillment of 
human needs. It can only be used for acquiring some goods or services. A 
commodity, on the other hand, has intrinsic utility and can be utilized directly 
without exchanging it for some other thing. 
(b) Commodities can be of different qualities while money has no quality except 
that it is a measure of value or a medium of exchange. Therefore, all the units 
of money of the same denomination, are hundred per cent equal to each other. An 
old and dirty note of SR.100 has the same value as a brand new note of SR.100. 
(c) In commodities, the transactions of sale and purchase are effected on an 
identified particular commodity. If A has purchased a particular car by 
pinpointing it, and seller has agreed, he deserves to receive the same car. The 
seller cannot compel him to take the delivery of another car, though of the same 
type or quality. Money, on the contrary, cannot be pinpointed in a transaction of 
exchange. If A has purchased a commodity from B by showing him a particular 
note of 100 SR.100 he can still pay him another note of the same 
denomination. 
Based on these basic differences, Islamic  shari‘a  has treated money differently 
from commodities, especially on two scores: Firstly, money (of the same 
denomination) is not held to be the subject matter of trade, like other commodities. 
Its use has been restricted  to  its  basic  purpose  i.e.  to  act  as  a  medium  of 
exchange and a measure of value. Secondly, if for exceptional reasons,  money  
has  to  be  exchanged  for  money  or  it  is borrowed, the payment on both sides 
must be equal, so that it is not used for the purpose it is not meant for i.e. trade in 
money itself. In short, money is treated as "potential" capital. It becomes actual 
capital only when it joins hands with other resources to undertake a productive 
activity. Islam recognizes the time value of money, but only when it acts as capital, 
not when it is "potential" capital. 
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2. Regulation of Islamic Finance 
Financial institutions seeking to offer shari‘a -compliant products typically have a 
shari‘a supervisory board (or at a minimum, a shari‘a counselor). The shari‘a 
board is to review and approve financial practices and activities for compliance 
with Islamic principles. Such expertise raises the attractiveness of shari‘a - 
compliant financial intermediaries to investors considering Islamic 
banking.International institutions have been established to promote international 
consistency in Islamic finance. The Accounting and Auditing Organization for 
Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), founded in 1991 and located in Bahrain, 
issues international standards on accounting, auditing, and corporate governance. 
It has 200 members from 45 countries; its membership includes central banks, 
Islamic financial institutions, and other bodies in the Islamic banking and finance 
industry. Another regulatory body is the Islamic Financial Services Boards 
(IFSB), which began operations in 2003 and is based in Malaysia. IFSB puts forth 
standards for supervision and regulation. Many leading Islamic financial centers 
around the world have adopted international SCF regulation standards.U.S. 
federal banking regulators have provided some formal guidance about Islamic 
products. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) issued two 
directives concerning shari‘a compliant mortgage products. In 1997, the OCC 
issued guidance about ijara (“lease”), a financial structure in which the financial 
intermediary purchases and subsequently leases an asset to a consumer for a 
fee. In 1999, the OCC recognized murabaha (“cost-plus”), under which the 
financial intermediary buys an asset for a customer with the understanding that 
the customer will buy the asset back for a higher fee. 
Standardization of Islamic finance regulations has been of increasing interest  in 
the industry. shari‘a is  open to interpretation and Islamic scholars are not in 
complete agreement regarding what constitutes SCF. Islamic finance laws and 
regulatory practices vary across countries. The lack of concurrent viewpoints 
makes it difficult to standardize Islamic financing. 
Standardization also may be challenging because the maturity of Islamic finance 
markets varies from country to country, with some markets well-established and 
others that are more nascent.   Without   standardization,   some   industry   
officials express concern that shari‘a -compliance risk may grow. The lack of 
standardization across Islamic finance markets raises legal uncertainty that a 
contract will not be recognized as valid under Islamic law by all Islamic scholars. 
This uncertainty has been highlighted by a recent dispute between Lebanon’s 
Blom Bank and Kuwait’s Islamic firm Investment Dar over whether or not a 
contract between the two entities was compliant with Islamic principles and 
if payment should be made. Many observers view standardization of SCF 
regulations as important in increasing the marketability and acceptance of 
Islamic products. Over the years, there have been numerous initiatives to improve 
regulatory practices. For example, in 2009, the IFSB published guiding principals 
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on issues such as governance and capital adequacy requirements for various 
financial products. The AAOIFI is in the process of developing new standards 
in risk management and corporate governance. 
1. Basic Islamic financial instruments 
Islamic markets offer different instruments to satisfy providers and users of 
funds in a variety of ways: sales, trade financing, and investment. Basic 
instruments include cost-plus financing (murabaha), profit-sharing (mudaraba) 
,leasing (ijara), partnership (musharaka) ,and for ward sale (bay’ salam), 
Deferred-payment sale (bay’ mu’ajjal) and deferred-delivery sale (bay’salam) 
contracts, in addition to spot sales, are used for conducting credit sales. In a 
deferred-payment sale, delivery of the product is taken on the spot but delivery of 
the payment is delayed for an agreed period. Payment can be made in a lump sum 
or in installments, provided there is no extra charge for the delay. A deferred-
delivery sale is similar to a forward contract where delivery of the product is 
in the future in exchange for payment on the spot market. 
These instruments serve as the basic building blocks for developing a wide array 
of more complex financial instruments, suggesting that there is great potential for 
financial innovation and expansion in Islamic financial markets. 
There are several methods of Islamic financing. However, in the world of 
commercial financing and more particularly, project financing, certain methods 
are more commonly encountered than others. These are set out below. 
 
A. Trade with markup or cost-plus sale (murabaha). One of the 
most widely used instruments for short-term financing is based on the 
traditional notion of purchase finance. The investor undertakes to supply 
specific goods or commodities, incorporating a mutually agreed contract for 
resale to the client and a mutually negotiated margin. 
Around 75 percent of Islamic financial transactions are cost-plus sales. 
Murabaha was originally an exchange transaction in which a trader purchases 
items required by an end user. The trader then sells those items to the end-user at 
a price that is calculated using an agreed profit margin over the costs incurred 
by the trader. 
To be in consonance  with the  principles of Islamic finance governing exchange 
transactions every murabaha transaction must meet the following conditions: 
Murabaha transactions may be undertaken only where the client of a bank, or 
financial institution, wants to purchase a commodity. This type of transaction 
cannot be effected in cases where the client wants to get funds for a purpose 
other than purchasing a commodity, like payment of salaries, settlement of bills or 
other liabilities. 
To make it a valid transaction it is necessary that the commodity is really purchased 
by the bank and it comes into the ownership and possession (physical or 
constructive) of the bank so that it may assume the risk of the commodity so far as 
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it remains under its ownership and possession. 
After acquiring the ownership and possession of the commodity it should be sold 
to the client through a valid sale. 
Some quarters have equated murabahah transactions to interest-based loans. 
However, there are many significant factors that distinguish a murabaha contract 
from a riba-based one. Some of them are the following: 
In the event of default by the end user, the financer only has recourse  to  the  
items  financed,  and  no  further  mark-up  or penalty may be applied to the sum 
outstanding. This means that the amount to be repaid does not go on increasing with 
passage of time as in the case of amounts borrowed from conventional banks on 
interest. Also, in conventional financing, the bank gives loans to its clients 
without ever being concerned how the money is being put to use. 
In the event of a murabahah transaction, no money is loaned to the client. Rather, 
the financing party purchases the goods himself, based on the requirement of 
the client. This ensures that financing  is always asset-based. In  effect, this 
type  of financing creates real assets and inventories.Another major difference 
between a murabahah contract and an interest-based one is that the financier cannot 
be unconcerned about the purposes for which the asset being leased is to be put to 
use. Conventional banks have no compunction in lending to gambling houses or 
liquor companies, or even pornographic filmmakers.Islamic principles of finance 
are based on a well-established rule which dictates that “The benefit of a thing 
is a return for the liability for loss from that thing”. Hence, in a murabahah 
transaction the bank or financier assumes the risk by purchasing the commodity 
before he sells it at a markup. This mark up is considered as the reward of the risk 
he assumes. Interest-bearing loans assume no risks whatsoever. In other words, 
because the bank takes title to the goods, and is therefore engaged in buying and 
selling, its profit derives from a real service that entails a certain risk. This 
aspect lends the transaction legitimacy. 
Most scholars have ruled that, to serve as a deterrent to such as may willfully delay 
payments, the financer may get the buyer to agree, at the time of the contract, 
to make a pre-specified donation to an agreed charity in case of late payment of 
monthly installments. 
These scholars, however, caution that this device should be used to the 
minimum extent and only in cases where musharakah or mudarabah are not 
practicable for one reason or another. 
B. Profit-sharing agreement (mudaraba). This is identical to an 
investment fund in which managers handle a pool of funds. The agent-
manager has relatively limited liability while having sufficient incentives to 
perform. The capital is invested in broadly defined activities, and the terms of 
profit and risk sharing are customized for each investment. The maturity 
structure ranges from short to medium term and is more suitable for trade 
activities. 
Mudaraba implies a contract between two parties whereby one party, the rabb al-
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mal (beneficial owner or the sleeping partner), entrusts money to the other party 
called the mudarib (managing trustee or the labour partner). The mudarib is to 
utilize it in an agreed manner and then returns to the rabb al-mal the principal and 
the pre-agreed share of the profit. He keeps for himself what remains of such profits. 
The following rules must govern all Mudaraba transactions: 
• The division of profits between the two parties must necessarily be on a 
proportional basis and cannot be a lump sum or guaranteed return. 
• The investor is not liable for losses beyond the capital he has contributed. 
The mudarib does not share in the losses except for the loss of his time and 
efforts. 
• Briefly, an Islamic bank lends money to a client to finance a factory, for 
example, in return for which the bank will get a specified percentage of 
the factory's net profits every year for a designated period. This share 
of the profits provides for repayment of the principal and a profit for the 
bank to pass on to its depositors. Should the factory lose money, the bank, 
its depositors and the borrower all jointly absorb the losses, thereby putting 
into practice the pivotal Islamic principle that the providers and users of 
capital should share risks and rewards. 
Islamic banks use this instrument to finance those seeking investments to run 
their own enterprises or professional units, whether they be physicians or engineers 
or traders or craftsmen. The bank provides the adequate finance as a capital owner 
in exchange of a share in the profit to be agreed upon. 
It is worth noting that this mode is a high risk for the bank because the 
bank  delivers  capital to the mudarib who undertakes the work and management 
and the mudarib shall only be a guarantor in case of negligence and trespass. 
Islamic banks usually take the necessary precautions to decrease the risk and to 
guarantee a better execution for the mudaraba and pursue this objective with 
seriousness. 
However, it may be noted that, under mudarabah, the liability of the financier is 
limited to the extent of his contribution to the capital, and no more. 
C. Equity participation (musharaka). This is analogous to a 
classical joint venture. Both entrepreneur and investor contribute to the 
capital (assets, technical and managerial expertise, working capital, 
etc.) of the operation in varying degrees and agree to share the returns (as well as 
the risks) in proportions agreed to in advance. Traditionally,this form of transaction 
has been used for financing fixed assets and working capital of medium- and 
long-term duration. 
Musharaka is a partnership, normally of limited duration, formed to carry out a 
specific project. 
It is, therefore, similar to a Western-style joint venture, and is also regarded by 
some as the purest form of Islamic financial instrument, since it conforms to the 
underlying partnership principles of sharing in, and benefiting from, risk. 
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Participation in 
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a musharaka can either be in a new project, or by providing additional funds 
for an existing one. Profits are divided on a pre- determined basis, and any losses 
shared in proportion to the capital contribution. In this case, the bank enters 
into a partnership with a client in which both share the equity capital- and maybe 
even the management -of a project or deal, and both share in the profits or losses 
according to their equity shareholding. There are two basic types of musharaka: 
i. Sharikah al milk: partnership based on joint ownership. This may be voluntary 
e.g. in the purchase of a ship, or involuntary 
e.g. as a result of inheritance. 
ii. Sharikah al uqud: partnership based on a contractual relationship. 
There are five subdivisions: 
1. Sharikat al Mufawadah (full authority and obligation): a limited partnership with 
equal capital contributions, responsibility, full authority on behalf of others, and  
responsibility for liabilities,incurred through the normal course of business. 
2. Sharikat al Inan (restricted authority and obligation): a limited partnership with 
unequal capital contributions. They do not share equal responsibility, and this 
reflects their share of the profits. 
3. Sharikat al Wujuh (goodwill /credit worthiness): companies based on the 
reputation of one or both parties, typically small scale business. 
4. Sharikat al Abdan (labour, skill and management): a company based on the 
contribution of  human efforts,  no capital contributions, again, typically small 
scale business. 
5. Sharikat al Mudaraba: a mudaraba 
D. Leasing (ijara). Another popular instrument, accounting for about 
10 percent of Islamic financial transactions, is leasing. Leasing is
 designed for financing vehicles, machinery, 
equipment, and aircraft. 
Different forms of leasing are permissible, including leases where a 
portion of the installment payment goes toward the final purchase (with the 
transfer of ownership to the lessee). 
 
Ijarah can be defined as a process by which " usufruct of a particular property 
is transferred to another person in exchange for a rent claimed from him/her". In 
many respects, Ijarah resembles leasing as it is practiced in today’s commercial 
world. The distinguishing feature of this mode is that the assets remain the property 
of the Islamic bank to put them up for rent every time the lease period terminates 
so as not to remain unutilized for long periods of time. Under ijarah the bank 
or the leasing company assumes the risk of recession or diminishing demand for 
these assets. 
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To be in consonance  with the  principles of Islamic finance governing 
financial transactions every ijarah transaction must meet the following 
conditions: 
• It is a condition that the object leased must not be perishable or 
consumable. 
• The lease is for the utilization not the consumption of the asset. 
• It is a condition that the subject of the contract must actually and 
legally be attainable. It is not permissible to lease something that cannot 
be delivered. 
• The lessee must ensure that the asset is used for the purpose it is 
made for. The lessee shall comply with the provisions of the contract. 
The lessee also shall not benefit from the asset in a way more than what 
has been agreed upon. 
• It is not permitted to lease real estate to be used as an interest based 
bank or a bar. However it is permissible to lease property to those whose 
major activities are permissible or halal even if they include some 
secondary prohibited practices. 
• The lessor must not only deliver the asset on time, on the date of 
commencement of lease, but also ensure that the lessor delivers those 
accessories as well which are essential for the lessee to benefit from the 
asset as per the norms. 
• The lease contract must state the lease period clearly. Renewal terms 
must also be stated clearly, and things like the rentals for all subsequent 
years, after the first year, should not mention clauses like ‘left to the sole 
discretion of the lessor’ and the like. 
• The rental must be money. The lease rent falls due from the receipt of 
the asset by the lessee, not the date the contract is signed. 
• The amount and timing of the lease payments should be agreed in 
advance. However, the agreed schedule and amount of those payments 
need not be uniform. 
• It is permissible for the two parties to agree during the lease period to 
review the lease period or the rental or both. That is because the lease 
contract occurs periodically unlike the sale contract where the transfer of 
ownership is immediate. 
• The lessor bears the liabilities when leasing the asset such as damage to the 
asset, payment of premium cost and basic maintenance. 
• There is no objection to authorizing the lessee to undertake all the 
above but the costs thereof must be borne by the lessor/owner. 
• The lessor/owner bears all the costs of the legally binding basic 
maintenance and these are operations on which the permanence and 
suitability of the leased object depend. 
 
  
The lessor also bears the cost of the replacement of durable parts. 
However, it is permissible to  make the lessee bear the cost of ordinary 
routine maintenance, because this cost is normally known and can be 
considered as part of the rental. 
• The conditions of usage of the leased items must be stated. The 
lessor must have full possession and legal ownership of the asset prior 
to leasing it. 
• A price cannot be pre-determined for the sale of the asset at the expiry of the 
lease. However, lessor and lessee may agree to the continuation of the 
lease or the sale of the leased asset to the lessee under a new agreement 
at the end of the initial lease period. 
• In the event of late payment of rental, the Ijarah may be terminated 
immediately. 
• The lessor may claim compensation for any damage caused to the leased 
assets as a result of negligence on the part of the lessee. 
Literally, Ijarah means to give something on rent. As a term of Islamic Fiqh, 
Ijarah can also refer to wages paid to a person in consideration of the services 
rendered by him/her. In the above discussion, the term Ijarah is used to represent 
the usufructs of assets and properties, and not to the services of human beings. 
 
 
E. Salam is one of the basic conditions for the validity of sale in shari‘a 
that the commodity intended to be sold must be in the physical or constructive 
possession of the seller. This condition has 
three implications: 
First, the commodity must be existing; a commodity that does not exist at the 
time of sale cannot be sold. 
Second, the seller should have acquired the ownership of that commodity. If the 
commodity exists but the seller does not own it, he cannot sell it to anybody. 
Third, mere ownership is not enough. It should have come in the possession of the 
seller, either physically or constructively. If the seller owns a commodity, but he has 
not acquired its delivery by himself or through an agent, he cannot sell it. 
There are only two exceptions to this general principle in shari‘a 
. One is Salam and the other is Istisna. Both are sales 
of a special nature. 
Salam, or Bay-Salaam as it is also called, is a sale whereby the seller undertakes to 
supply some specific goods to the buyer at a future date in exchange for an advanced 
price fully paid on the spot. 
Here the price is paid in cash, but the supply of the purchased goods is deferred. 
The buyer is called "Rabb-us-Salam", the seller is "Muslam ilaih", the cash 
price is "ra's-ul-mal", and the purchased commodity is termed as "muslam fih". 
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The shari‘a allows Salam subject to certain conditions. The basic purpose of 
this sale was to meet the needs of the small farmers who needed money to grow 
their crops and to feed their family up to the time of their harvest. After the 
prohibition of riba they could not take usurious loans. Therefore, it was allowed for 
them to sell the agricultural products in advance. 
Similarly, the traders of Arabia used to export goods to other places and to 
import other goods to their homeland. They needed money to undertake this type 
of business. They could not borrow from the usurers after the prohibition of riba. 
It was, therefore, allowed for them that they sell the goods in advance. After 
receiving their cash price, they could easily undertake the aforesaid business. 
Salam was beneficial to the seller, because he received the price in advance, and 
it was beneficial to the buyer also, because normally, the price in Salam used 
to be lower than price in spot sales. 
The permissibility of Salam was an exception to the general rule that prohibits 
forward sales. Therefore, it was subjected to some strict conditions. 
Conditions of Salam: 
It is necessary for the validity of Salam that the buyer pays the price in full to the 
seller at the time of effecting the sale. This is necessary because in the absence of 
full payment by the buyer, it will be tantamount to a sale of debt against debt, 
which is expressly prohibited. Moreover, the basic wisdom behind the 
permissibility of Salam is to fulfill the instant needs of the seller. If the price is 
not paid to him in full, the basic purpose of the transaction will be defeated. 
Salam can be effected in those commodities only whose quality and quantity can 
be specified exactly. The things whose quality or quantity is not determined by the 
specification cannot be sold through the contract of Salam. For example, the 
precious stones cannot be sold on the basis of Salam, because every piece of 
precious stones is normally different from the other either in its quality or in its size 
or weight and their exact specification is not generally possible. 
Salam cannot be effected on a particular commodity or on a product of a 
particular field or farm. 
For example, if the seller undertakes to supply wheat of a particular field, 
or the fruit of a particular tree, the Salam will not be valid, because there is a 
possibility that produce of that particular field or the fruit of that tree is 
destroyed before the delivery, and in the presence of this possibility the 
delivery remains uncertain. The same rule is applicable to every commodity 
whose supply is not certain. It is necessary that the quality of the commodity 
(intended to be purchased through Salam) be fully specified leaving no 
ambiguity that may lead to dispute. All the possible details in this respect must be 
expressly mentioned. 
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It is also necessary that the quantity of the commodity be agreed upon in 
unequivocal terms. If the commodity is quantified in weights according to the 
usage of its traders, its weight must be determined, and if it is quantified through 
measures, its exact measure should be known. What is normally weighed cannot be 
specified in measures and vice versa. 
The exact date of delivery must be specified in the contract. Salam cannot be 
effected in respect of those things that must be delivered at the spot. For 
example, if gold is purchased in exchange for silver, it is necessary, according 
to  shari‘a , that the delivery of both be simultaneous. Here, Salam cannot work. 
Similarly,  if  wheat  is  bartered  for  barley,  the  simultaneous delivery of both 
is necessary for the validity of sale, therefore, the contract of Salam in this case 
is not allowed. 
It is permissible to draw a Salam sale contract on one whole thing but to be 
possessed at different times in specific parts. 
Salam sale is not permissible on existing commodities because damage and 
deterioration cannot be assured before delivery on the due date. Delivery may 
become impossible. 
Salam is permissible on a commodity of a specific locality if it is assured that it is 
almost always available in that locality and it rarely becomes unavailable. 
The place of delivery must be stated in the contract if the commodity needs 
loading or transportation expenses.It is permissible to take mortgage and guarantor 
on Salam debt to guarantee that the seller satisfies his obligation by delivering the 
commodity sold, which is a liability on the due date. 
It is not permissible for the buyer of a Salam commodity to sell it before receiving 
it because that is similar to the prohibited sale of debts before holding. It is known 
that the Salam commodity is a liability debt on the seller and not an existing 
commodity. Instead of that, it is permissible for the buyer to draw a parallel Salam 
contract without connecting it to the first Salam contract. Salam sale is suitable for 
the finance of agriculture operations, where the bank can transact with farmers 
who are expected to have the commodity in plenty during harvest either from 
their own crops or crops of others, which they can buy and deliver in case their 
crops fail. Thus the bank renders great services to the farmers in their way to achieve 
their production targets. 
Salam sale is also used to finance commercial and industrial activities, 
especially phases prior to production and export of commodities and that is 
by purchasing them on Salam and marketing them for lucrative prices. 
The Salam sale is applied by banks in financing craftsmen and small producers by 
supplying them with inputs of production as a Salam capital in exchange for 
some of their commodities to remarket. 
The scope of Salam sale is large enough to cover the needs of various people such 
as farmers, industrialists, contractors or traders. It can cover the finance of 
operational costs and capital goods. 
F. Istisna is the second kind of sale where a commodity is 
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transacted before it comes into existence. 
It means to order a manufacturer to manufacture a specific commodity for 
the purchaser. If the manufacturer undertakes to manufacture the goods for him, the 
transaction of Istisna comes into 
existence. But it is necessary for the validity of Istisna that the price is fixed with 
the consent of the parties and that necessary specification of the commodity 
(intended to be manufactured) is fully settled between them. 
The contract of Istisna creates a moral obligation on the manufacturer to 
manufacture the goods, but before he starts the work, any one of the parties may 
cancel the contract after giving notice to the other. 
But after the manufacturer has started the work, the contract cannot be cancelled 
unilaterally. 
However, the party placing the order has the right to retract if the commodity does 
not conform to the specifications demanded. 
Istisna as a Mode of Financing: can be used for providing the facility of 
financing in certain transactions, especially in the sector of house financing. 
If the client has his own land and he seeks financing for the construction  of  
a  house,  the  financier  may  undertake  to construct the house on that open 
land, on the basis of Istisna, and if the client has no land and he wants to purchase 
the land also, the financier may undertake to provide him a constructed house 
on the specified piece of land. 
Since it is not necessary in Istisna that the price is paid in advance, nor is 
it necessary that it is paid at the time of the delivery, rather, it may be deferred 
to any time according to the agreement of the parties, therefore, the time of payment 
may be fixed in whatever manner they wish. The payment may also be in 
installments. 
On the other hand, it is not necessary that the financier himself construct the 
house. He can enter into a parallel contract of Istisna with a third party, or may 
hire the services of a contractor (other than the client). In both cases, he can 
calculate his cost and fix the price of Istisna with his client in a manner that may 
give him a reasonable profit over his cost. The payment of installments by 
the client may start, in this case, right from the day when the contract of Istisna 
is signed by the parties, and may continue during the construction of the house 
and after it is handed over to the client. In order to secure the payments of 
installments, the bank, as a security, may keep the title deeds of the house or land, 
or any other property, until the client pays the last installment. The bank, in this case, 
will be responsible for the construction of the house in full conformity with the 
specifications detailed in the agreement. In case of discrepancy, the financier will 
undertake such alterations at his own cost as may be necessary for bringing it in 
harmony with the terms of the contract. 
The instrument of Istisna may also be used for project financing on similar lines. 
If a client wants to install machinery in his factory, and the machinery needs 
to be manufactured, the financier may undertake to prepare the machinery through 
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the contract of Istisna according to the aforesaid procedure. The same principles 
will be fully applicable to the construction of a building for the industry. 
Istisna contracts open wide fields of application for the Islamic banks to finance 
the public needs and the vital interests of the society to develop the Islamic 
economy. Istisna contracts are applied in high technology industries such as the 
aircraft industry, locomotive and ship building industries, in addition to the 
different types of machines produced in large factories or workshops. The Istisna 
contract is also applied in the construction industry for apartment buildings, 
hospitals, schools, and universities. 
Difference between Istisna and Salam: 
1. The subject of Istisna is always a thing that needs manufacturing, while 
Salam can be effected on anything, no matter whether it needs manufacturing 
or not. 
2. It is necessary for Salam that the price is paid in advance, while it is not 
necessary in Istisna. 
3. The contract of Salam, once effected, cannot be cancelled unilaterally, while 
the contract of Istisna can be cancelled before the manufacturer starts the work. 
4. The time of delivery is an essential part of the sale in Salam while it is not 
necessary in Istisna that the time of the delivery be fixed. 
5. The buyer may stipulate in the Istisna  contract that the commodity shall be 
manufactured or produced by a specific manufacturer, or manufactured from 
specific materials. This is not permitted in the case of Salam sale. 
Difference Between Istisna and Ijarah : 
It should also be kept in mind that the manufacturer, in Istisna, undertakes to 
make the required goods with his own material. Therefore, this transaction 
implies that the manufacturer shall obtain the material, if it is not already with 
him, and shall undertake the work required for making the ordered goods with it. 
However, if the customer provides the material, and the manufacturer is 
required to use his labor and skill only, the transaction is not Istisna. In this 
case it will be a transaction of Ijarah whereby the services of a person are 
retained for a specified fee paid to him. 
 
 
D. Islamic bonds (Sukuk) : 
 
Muslim jurists subject the buying and selling of debt obligations to certain 
conditions in order to comply with the prohibition of riba (interest), gharar 
(uncertainty), and maysir (gambling). specify these conditions in detail. In 
summary, the debt must be a genuine one i.e., it must not be a subterfuge to borrow 
money such as an asset-linked buy-back arrangement. The debtor must 
acknowledge the trade and creditors must be known, accessible, and sound. 
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Trading must be on a spot basis and not against debt. Importantly, the price cannot 
be other than the face value. In line with these principles, early doctrine on interest-
free finance disallowed corporate or government bonds and the discounting of 
bills. Pressures for innovation have resulted in finding a way out of these 
limitations, admitting ‘financial engineering’. In particular, leasing-based bonds 
(sukuk al-ijara) have been developed. Although other sukuk have been issued, eg 
sukuk al-mudaraba, sukuk al-musharaka, sukuk al- murabaha, the ijara sukuk 
remains the most popular. 
Sukuk means participation certificate, and is commonly referred to as an ‘Islamic 
bond’. Techniques similar to conventional structured finance securities are 
employed, with sukuk akin to pass-through certificates. A sakk simply 
represents a proportional or undivided ownership interest in an asset or pool of 
assets . Islamic bonds are more useful if they can be traded 
on the secondary market to gain liquidity. As indicated above,certain requirements 
must be met with respect to the trading capacity of the bonds on the Islamic 
financial market. Specifically, they cannot represent a debt (in Islam, debt-selling is 
forbidden), as conventional bonds can. Instead they must constitute property of 
an approved asset. Such a bond is obtained through the securitization of the asset, 
the property of which is divided into equally valued units and incorporated in the 
sukuk certificates. The value of the sukuk thus remains connected to the value of 
the underlying asset. While they come in zero coupon and coupon versions, the 
productivity and return is linked to the profit of the underlying asset and not 
to an interest rate (although an interest rate such as LIBOR can be used as a 
‘benchmark’). 
Consider, for example, the case of the sukuk al-ijara. The originator holds assets 
(land, buildings, aircraft, ships, etc) that are to constitute the basis of the returns 
to the sukuk investor. These assets are sold by the originator to a special 
purpose vehicle (SPV) and then are leased back at a specified rental. The SPV 
securitizes the assets by issuing sukuk certificates that can be purchased by 
investors. Each sukukIn what ways does Islamic banking differ from conventional 
finance? 
certificate represents a share in the ownership of the assets, entitling the investor 
to periodic distributions from the SPV funded by the originator’s rental payments 
on the leased assets. 
The  returns  can  be  either  fixed  rate  or  floating  rate  (often referenced to LIBOR 
as a ‘benchmark’) depending on the originator. 
So far, AAOIFI (the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institutions) has issued Standards for fourteen types of sukuk .These can be 
broadly grouped into sukuk that bear predetermined returns and sukuk that allow 
for sharing of profit and, in some instances, loss. Sukuk al-murabaha and 
sukuk al-murabaha are examples of profit-and-loss-sharing sukuk. To date, most 
issued sukuk have borne predetermined returns, and the majority of such sukuk have 
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been sukuk al-ijara, frequently at a predetermined rate of return. 
In fact, the basic structure of a sukuk is very flexible and can be varied in a number 
of ways. The underlying assets that are pooled and securitized can be ijara, 
murabaha, istisnaa or musharaka receivables, or combinations of them, and the 
rates of return can be fixed, floating or zero coupon. Investment risks (credit risk, 
interest rate risk, foreign exchange risk, market price risk, liquidity risk) are much 
the same as those of conventional bonds, and depend on the way the securitization 
is structured, although one unique risk is that of shari’a compliance, a factor 
which also governs the tradeability of the sukuk. 
Indeed, it is the potential for tradeability that primarily makes for the popularity 
of sukuk al-ijara. Ijara, though less commonly employed than murabaha as an 
asset in Islamic banks’ balance sheets offers much greater flexibility for the Islamic 
bond market. Each security called sukuk-al-ijara represents a pro rata 
ownership of physical assets as against a pro rata share in financial claims or 
debt in the case of sukuk-al-murabaha. While debt can only be transferred at par, 
ownership in physical assets can always be transferred at a mutually negotiated 
price. Hence sukuk-al-ijara allow for creation of a secondary market since they 
represent a share in the ownership of a physical asset. 
In 2010 Sukuk issuances hit a record of US$47.78 billion if compared to the 
last five years; managing to surpass 2007 peak level by around 7% and 50% if 
compared to 2009. If this was to convey something, it would be the increasing 
confidence the global markets are regaining. According to Dow Jones Islamic 
Markets Indices December Commentary, the DJIM Citigroup Sukuk Index 
gained 9.1% in 2010 finishing at 125.32 points. 
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As at end-2012, the value of outstanding global sukuk topped USD 229.4 
billion – a record high helped by new issuances worth USD 131.2 billion. 
Malaysia, Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia feature among the 
countries that have been at the forefront of growth in the sukuk primary market. 
Third quarter of 2012 saw the debut of the first Islamic Basel III compliant Tier I 
structure, closely followed in first quarter of 2013 by another Islamic bank, 
both from the UAE, successfully raising US$1b each. 
Finally, Islam has laid down a number of conditions to ensure that credit expands 
in step with the growth of the real rector. Some of these conditions are: 
1. The asset which is being sold or leased must be real, and not imaginary or 
notional; 
2. The seller must own and possess the goods being sold or leased; 
3. The transaction must be a genuine trade transaction with the full intention of 
giving and taking delivery; and 
4. The debt cannot be sold and thus the risk of default associated with it must 
be borne by the lender himself. 
The first condition will help eliminate most of the speculative and gambling 
transactions which involve notional goods and which constituted a major part of 
the derivatives transactions during the current crisis. The second condition will 
help ensure that the seller (or lessor) also shares a part of the risk to be able to get 
a share in the return. Once the seller (financier) acquires ownership and possession 
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of the goods for sale or lease, he/she bears the risk. This condition will put a 
constraint on short sales, and thereby remove the possibility of a steep decline in 
asset prices during a downturn. The shari‘a has, however, made an exception to 
this rule in the case of salam and istisna where the goods are not already available 
in the market and need to be produced or manufactured before delivery. This will 
help ensure that financing expands in step with the rise of the real economy and 
thereby help curb excessive credit expansion. 
The third and the fourth conditions will not only help eliminate a great deal of 
speculative and derivatives transactions where there is no intention of giving or 
taking delivery, but also motivate the creditor to be more cautious in evaluating the 
credit risk. This will prevent an unnecessary explosion in the volume and value of 
transactions and also help keep the rise in debt to be in step with the rise of the 
real economy. It will also release a greater volume of financial resources for the 
real sector and, thereby, help expand employment and self-employment 
opportunities and the production of need-fulfilling goods and services. 
The discipline that Islam wishes to introduce in the financial system may not 
materialize unless the governments reduce their borrowing from the central bank 
to a level that is in harmony with the goal of price and financial stability. Even 
borrowing from the private sector should be primarily for development that will 
increase its ability to repay. Borrowing for meeting current spending needs to be 
avoided except in extreme circumstances. This is because borrowing does not 
eliminate the ultimate need for sacrifice. 
Without this consciousness about the ultimate need for sacrifice, the need for 
borrowing is most likely to become path dependent.A number of objections may be 
raised here against these conditions. One of these is that hedging is a genuine need 
of the economy and the restrictions specified above may stand against it. Genuine 
hedging or insurance which is undertaken by a person or firm to provide  
protection against losses actually incurred has been recognized by Muslim jurists. 
However, what is prohibited is ‘hedging’ that is not related to a real transaction 
and is rather of a speculative and gambling nature. A second objection may be 
that all these conditions will tend to shrink the size of the economy by reducing 
the number and volume of derivatives transactions. There is not doubt that the 
number of transactions will be reduced. However, it will be primarily those 
transactions which are of a speculative and gambling nature and are generally 
recognized to be zero-sum games. These have rarely contributed significantly to 
total real output. The compounded annual rate of growth of total outstanding 
derivatives between 2000 and 2007 was 29.9 percent per annum while that in total 
real world output was only 3.1 percent per annum. Hence a decline in speculative 
and gambling transactions is not likely to hurt the real economy significantly. 
While a restriction on such transactions will cut the commissions earned by 
speculators during an artificially generated boom, it will help them avert losses 
and bankruptcy that become unavoidable during the decline and lead to a financial 
crisis. 
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E.  ISLAMIC BANKING 
 
 
The emergence of Islamic banking in recent years is one of the most important 
trends in the economic sector, and with the estimated 1.6 billion Muslims 
worldwide, it’s ripe for growth potential. 
There has always been a demand among Muslims for financial products and 
services that conform to shari‘a (Islamic Law). The development of viable 
alternatives to conventional finance increasingly enables Muslims to participate in 
the financial world without violating their Islamic principles and without bearing 
the economic penalty that comes from non-participation, especially with the recent 
growth of oil prices. 
Currently, the Islamic banking industry consists of several hundred billion dollars, 
and more than 300 financial institutions in and outside the Muslim world. There 
is $300 billion in assets managed according to Islamic principles, ranging from 
commercial to investment banks and investment funds, all providing Islamic 
products. 
Others estimate the industry to be even larger. Financial Services Authority, the 
financial services regulator in the United Kingdom, for example, recently 
suggested Islamic banking was as large as $500 billion. Standard & Poor’s, a 
rating agency, estimates that the sukuk (deed) market has reached $70 billion, and 
will top the $160 billion mark by the end of the decade. 
 
Islamic financial services are now evolving from a niche market to the mainstream. 
In addition to the sheer number of Muslims worldwide, global financial 
institutions are taking a strong interest in Islamic products since the industry is in 
its nascent stage. Products have yet to be commoditized from competition, 
therefore allowing profit margins to remain high. 
What is Islamic banking? 
Islamic banking can be considered banking with a conscience. Islamic banks 
each have a  shari‘a  board made up of  shari‘a scholars as well as financial 
experts who are responsible for determining what activities are and are not 
shari‘a -compliant. Islamic banking is based on two main financial principles. 
Firstly, investment is to be made in the private sector through interest- free
 financing. Secondly, the development of financial 
instruments is to be done on the basis of profit and loss sharing as well as sharing 
risks. 
Further, Islamic banking is built around shari‘a , mainly prohibiting the charging 
of interest. Because Islam considers interest an unjustified increase of capital, 
with no effort made to earn it, it is considered of false value, and therefore is 
prohibited. However, there are many arguments about the prohibition of interest 
in Islam. The first argument is that interest rates have no moral foundation. The 
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second is that abstinence from consumption is not a justification of rewards. 
Lastly, some argue that there are risks to justify the supplement of payment for 
capital lending if the loan is guaranteed. 
In addition to the prohibition of interest payments, Islamic law treats money 
strictly as a medium of exchange. In other words, money, in itself, does not have 
any inherent value, and therefore it should not lead to the production of more 
money. In Islamic banking, the creditor/debtor relationship is defined differently 
than in the secular financial world. The creditor, or provider, of funds who 
becomes a partner in a project assumes the risk activity with the entrepreneur 
and shares profits as well as losses. 
The creation of incremental wealth justifies the share of profit between the 
borrower and the lender of money, but does not guarantee a fixed return. 
Some of the principle instruments involved in the aforementioned form of 
resource mobilization include the following: 
Trade financing and cost-plus mark-up on traded goods (murabaha). 
Profit-sharing (mudarabah) and equity participation (musharaka) in which cost-
sharing among partners is also included. 
Rental on purchased equipment (ijara). 
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Islamic banking portfolio using secondary financing instruments, 
 
such as shares and stocks revolving around the above- 
mentioned instruments.   
Conventional vs. Islamic banking 
 
 
 
 
 
In particular, Islamic banks are already serving 38 million customers globally, 
two-thirds of who reside in seven countries, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, 
Bahrain, Indonesia, and Turkey. One-fifth of the banking system assets across 
these countries have now transitioned to Islamic. In Saudi Arabia, supply push 
has seen share of Islamic banking cross 50percent of system assets. 
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The global market for Islamic financial services, as measured by shari‘a compliant 
assets, is estimated by TheCityUK to have increased in 2013, to a record 
$1,688bn. 
 
 
 The industry is set to grow significantly in the years ahead. At the current rate of 
growth the market could top $2 trillion in assets by the end of 2014. The largest 
centres remain concentrated in Malaysia and the Middle East, including Iran, 
Saudi Arabia, UAE and Kuwait. 
 
 
 
Islamic finance has shown resilience at a time when the global economy has  
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slowed  and  conventional  banking  in  Western countries has been under 
pressure. Global assets of Islamic finance have doubled since the start of the 
economic slowdown. Considerable potential exists for expansion of Islamic 
finance. The Muslim population numbering some 1.6 billion accounts for nearly 
a quarter of the global population, but Sharia compliant assets make up only 
around 1percent of the world’s financial assets. Less than a fifth of Muslims 
worldwide currently use Islamic financial products. The extent of the industry’s 
penetration varies substantially .There are over 700 institutions registered 
globally as sharia- compliant organisations in financial services. Of these, 
around 500 are full-fledged standalone institutions, and the remainder operate 
sharia-compliant products within a conventional institution or known as Islamic 
windows. Countries with most of the 430 firms reporting to The Banker’s survey 
include Bahrain and Indonesia with 74 and 71 firms respectively. Malaysia, Iran, 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were in a group of countries with more than 50 firms. 
 
F. Leading organizations of Islamic finance 
In the beginning the industry focused all its attention on retail, which was followed by 
commercial banking activities. The next step, capital market activities, took a bit 
longer time to be developed, but it began to boom in a very short time and this boom 
attracted more and more actors into this business, especially western countries in the 
mid 1990s. As the Islamic finance industry attracted more and more countries and the 
public interest grew all over the world, central banks and regulatory authorities in 
these countries began to call for regulations and supervision of the Islamic finance 
industry. Another additional problem that followed the boom in IFIs was the 
difference in products available by these institutions. IFIs in the beginning of 1970s 
began increasingly to consult experts in Islamic law in order to be sure if their product 
were adherent to Shari‘a. However, there was need for a standard setting so the 
products at least could be of same content, if not the same name. All these problems 
led to the establishment of Shari‘a boards within the IFIs. But this was not enough 
because the inconsistencies in interpretations of different Shari‘a boards in IFIs led to 
the fact that some transactions were Shari‘a compliant in the rules of one board and 
not compliant with Shari‘a in the rules of other board. Therefore, international 
standard setting organs such as Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic 
Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), Islamic 
International Rating Agency (IIRA), and International Islamic Financial Market 
(IIFM) were found to facilitate, by issuing international standards and guidelines, the 
homogeneous interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence and dealing with corporate 
governance issues. Recently the International Islamic Liquidity Management Corp 
(IILM) has been established to assist institutions offering Islamic financial services in 
addressing their liquidity management issues in an efficient and effective manner. 
These main bodies of Islamic finance are explained in detail in the following 
subchapters.  
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1. Shari‘a Boards 
It should be stressed that Shari‘a board is not a standard setting body in itself, but 
assist other regulatory and standard setting organizations in establishing and 
maintaining a good governance practice among IFIs. Shari‘a board is a committee of 
Islamic scholars whose job is to verify if the new products presented by IFIs comply 
with Shari‘a. These scholars’ functions are similar to members of boards in 
conventional corporations, i.e. they are not employed be IFIs but receive honoraria, 
and they have the right to be members of Shari‘a boards in different IFIs 
simultaneously. The latter is because there are few dozen countable Shari‘a scholars 
who are familiar with both Islamic law and modern financial needs in the world. 
Although the numbers of such scholars are growing, they still lag behind the growth 
of the industry need.  The first ever Shari‘a board was established by Egypt’s Faisal 
Islamic Bank in 1976 and soon other IFIs followed this example. Today Shari‘a 
boards of IFIs are required by law in majority of Islamic countries, and even if it is 
not required by law, Shari‘a boards have become an important part of IFIs. However, 
lately Shari‘a boards have been criticized by many economists for being a part of 
corporate governance or agency theory problems in IFIs because of conflict of 
interests. To tackle these kinds of problems Malaysia as the first country in the world 
has regulated scholars to be member of the Shari‘a board of maximum three IFIs 
simultaneously. AAOIFI standards have defined Shari‘a boards’ duty as directing, 
reviewing and supervising the activities of the IFIs in order to ensure that they are in 
compliance with Shari‘a principles. AAOIFI standards have also made it mandatory 
for all IFIs to elect their Shari‘a board members through the shareholders annual 
general meeting upon the recommendation of the board of directors, taking into 
consideration local legislation and regulations. Furthermore it states that these 
members should not be chosen among directors and majority shareholders of the IFI. 
Maintaining and formalizing the internal regulatory role of Shari‘a boards is 
considered vital as these internal bodies are best placed to assist their individual 
organizations in achieving Shari‘a compliance, and thus play an important role in the 
overall regulatory environment.  
2. AAOIFI 
The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI) is an Islamic international autonomous non-profit making corporate body 
that prepares accounting, auditing, governance, ethics and Shari‘a standards for 
Islamic financial institutions. It was established in accordance with the Agreement of 
Association which was signed by Islamic financial institutions on 26 February 1990 
in Algiers. The AAOIFI has a two-tiered organizational structure in order to separate 
the standard-setting function from financing the organization, so that the standard 
setters are not subject to a conflict of interest.  IFIs are not obliged to adapt AAOIFIs 
standards and guidelines. However, regulatory and supervisory authorities around the 
world are increasingly relying upon them and align their standards according to it. For 
example many Shari‘a boards consist of at least three scholars who have a 
comprehensive financial expertise and education in legal questions according to 
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AAOIFI standards. The AAOIFI provides guidelines for IFIs when/if they face 
difficulties in interpretations, or understanding of issues related to new financial 
products. So far the AAOIFI has issued 25 standards in accounting, 5 in auditing, 7 in 
corporate governance and 2 codes of ethics. The AAOIFI is focusing on the auditing 
and accounting side, where processes and transactions need to be handled differently 
from conventional banking practice.   
3. IFSB 
To ensure the sound and stable development of the Islamic financial industry, it needs 
to be supported by a strong regulatory and supervisory framework. To fulfill this 
requirement, the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) was established in 2002. 
The IFSB is an international body hosted by Malaysia. It has the important mandate 
of developing the prudential standards in accordance with the unique features of the 
Islamic financial institution.  IFSB was established under the sponsorship of the 
International Monetary Fund, and in close cooperation with IMF and Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, has become one of the most influential 
international organizations that promote Islamic finance and its standards. IFSB tries 
to adapt the existing standards and guidelines of the mentioned organizations and 
adjusts them in accordance with the Shari‘a principles to IFIs. The IFSB's focus is 
very much on the standardization of procedures and the way Shari‘a rulings are 
interpreted across the industry.  Since its establishment the IFSB has issued 17 
standards, guiding principles and technical notes in the areas of risk management, 
corporate governance, transparency and market discipline, and etc. IFSB is closely 
cooperating with the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International 
Organization for Securities Commissions and the International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors. 
4. IIRA 
The Islamic International Rating Agency (IIRA) started operations in July 2005 to 
facilitate development of the regional and national financial markets by delineating 
relative investment or credit risk, providing an assessment of the risk profile of entities 
and instruments. This should be an integral part of the decision process employed by 
institutional investors. IIRA assists the Islamic financial services industry to gain 
recognition locally and internationally as strong and capable financial institutions, 
adhering to greater standards of disclosure and transparency. Its mission is to support 
the development of the regional capital market and to improve its functioning.  IIRA 
has become an alternative to the international rating agencies and it aims to become a 
reference on which investors and financiers can rely to achieve “Quality” in terms of 
compliance with the related Shari‘a rules and principles for Islamic financial services. 
IIRA is a profit making body and it works like its conventional counterparts, charging 
a set fee per piece of work.  
5. IIFM 
International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM) is the global standardization body for 
the Islamic Capital & Money Market segment of the IFIs. Its primary focus lies in the 
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standardization of Islamic financial products, documentation and related processes.  
The Agreement to establish the IIFM was signed in November 2001 by the Governors 
of the Central banks /Monetary Agencies Malaysia, Bahrain, Indonesia, Sudan, and 
the President of the Islamic Development Bank. It began its operation in 2002. Its 
main objectives are: 
1. To spur the establishment and development of an international 
financial market based on Shari‘a rules and principles 
2. Addressing the issue of liquidity management in IFIs 
3. Developing an active secondary market, and  
4. Creating the environment that will encourage both Islamic and non-
Islamic financial institutions to actively participate in a secondary 
market and the information of new traceable instructions. 
IIFM will also act as the focal point for the harmonization of Shari‘a interpretations 
in the global financial market and enhance the cooperative framework among IFIs 
globally. In September 2006 the IIFM signed a Memorandum of Understanding with 
the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), with an eye to 
developing a master agreement for documenting privately negotiated Shari‘a-
compliant derivatives transactions. In march 2010 the ISDA/IIFM Tahawwut master 
agreement was launched. It is a completely new framework document though the 
structure of the document is similar to the conventional ISDA Master Agreement. 
However, the key mechanisms and provisioning such as early termination events, 
closeout and netting are developed based on the Islamic Shari’ah principles. 
6. IILM 
The International Islamic Liquidity Management Corp (IILM) is a collaborative effort 
by 11 central banks or monetary agencies from countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Iran, Luxembourg and the United Arab Emirates, as well as two multilateral 
organizations to assist institutions offering Islamic financial services in addressing 
their liquidity management. The IILM has been established to assist institutions 
offering Islamic financial services in addressing their liquidity management issues in 
an efficient and effective manner. This institution addresses one of the fundamental 
problems of Islamic financial institutions: the provision of adequate liquidity in times 
of stress. The IILM is expected to issue high quality, triple A-rated liquid, tradable 
and low risk Shari‘a-compliant financial instruments at both the national level and 
across borders, to enhance the soundness and stability of the Islamic financial markets. 
The instruments of the IILM will be utilized in liquidity management as eligible 
collateral for interbank transactions and central bank financing, or through trading of 
IILM instruments (either within the same country or cross border) in the secondary 
market. As the IILM is intended to facilitate cross-border liquidity management, its 
instruments shall be denominated in major reserve currencies such as the US dollar 
and the euro. This is to ensure access to a large pool of global investors and broaden 
the range of its holders, thereby enhancing the prospects for active secondary market. 
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If the assets can be traded through the IILM, then much fewer of these assets will be 
held by the institutions. 
 
III. Corporate governance in Islamic Finance: basic concepts and issues 
 
A. Definition of corporate governance 
 
 
The agency problem arises because of the relationship between the owners and the 
management. The scandal in corporate governance made the scholars defining 
corporate governance based on the problem solving perspective or corporate 
affairs perspective. In addition, most definition states that internal governance 
mechanism involves board of directors and ownership structure while external 
involves to take over market and legal system. 
 
The governments of the 30 OECD countries have approved a revised version of 
the OECD's Principles of Corporate Governance adding new recommendations for 
good practice in corporate behaviour with a view to rebuilding and maintaining 
public     trust     in     companies     and     stock      markets. 
 
The revised Principles respond to a number of issues that have undermined the 
confidence of investors in company management in recent years. They call  on  
governments to ensure genuinely effective regulatory frameworks and on 
companies themselves to be truly accountable. They advocate an increased 
awareness among institutional investors and an effective role for shareholders in 
executive compensation. They also urge strengthened transparency and disclosure 
to counter conflicts of interest. 
 
Corporate governance aims at providing institutions with a body of rules and 
principles, with a view to ensuring that good practices guide overall management 
of an institution. It has now come to mean the whole process of managing a 
company and the incentive structure to address principal-agent issues and 
ensure that executive management serves the long-term best interests of the 
shareholders and sustainable value of the company in conformity with the laws 
and ethics of the country. All of the complex factors that are involved in 
balancing the power between the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), the board, 
and the shareholders are now considered to be a part of the corporate 
governance framework, including auditing, balance sheet and off-balance 
disclosure, and transparency. 
Hence, corporate governance refers to the method by which a corporation is 
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directed, administered and controlled. It includes the laws and customs affecting 
that direction, as well as the goals for which it is governed. Corporate 
governance mechanisms, incentives and controls are designed to reduce the 
inefficiencies that arise from moral hazard and adverse selection. Corporate 
governance is also viewed as a process of monitoring performance by applying 
appropriate counter- measures and dealing with transparency, integrity and 
accountability. It organizes the way corporations are accountable to 
shareholders and the public, and also the monitoring of the executive 
management of organisations in running their businesses. 
 
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, first published in 1999, have 
been widely adopted as a benchmark both in OECD countries and elsewhere. 
They are used as one of 12 key standards by the Financial Stability Forum for 
ensuring international financial stability and by the World Bank in its work to   
improve   corporate   governance   in   emerging   markets. 
 
In 2002, OECD governments called for a review of the Principles to take account 
of developments in the corporate sector. The revised text is the product of a 
consultation process involving representatives of both OECD and non-OECD 
governments as well as of businesses and professional bodies, trade unions, civil 
society organisations and international standard-setting bodies. The OECD began 
a review of the principles in 2003 considering the recent changes and 
developments and after an extensive review the process led to adopt revised 
and reviewed OECD principles of corporate governance in April, 2004. The 
revision principles not only reflect the experience of OECD countries but also the 
emerging and developing economics. The revised principles are non-binding in 
nature and it lays up to the governments and market participants to decide for their 
own framework. It also confirmed the adaptability of the principles as a reference 
in varying legal, economic and cultural contexts. “Corporate governance is the 
system by which business corporations are directed and controlled . The 
corporate governance specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities 
among different participants in the corporation, such as the board, managers, 
shareholders and other stakeholders, and spell out the rules and procedures for 
making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, it also provides the 
structures through which the company objectives are set, and the means of 
attaining those objectives and monitoring performance”. The following are the 
main areas of the OECD principles and its annotation: 
Principle 1: Ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework. 
Annotation: The corporate governance framework  should promote transparent 
and efficient markets, be consistent with the rule of law and clearly articulate 
the division of responsibilities among different supervisory, regulatory and 
enforcement authorities. 
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Principle 2: The right of shareholders and key ownership functions. 
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Annotation: The corporate governance framework should 
protect and facilitate the exercise of shareholders’ rights. 
Principle 3: The equitable treatment of shareholders. Annotation: The
 corporate governance framework should 
ensure the equitable treatment of all shareholders, including minority and 
foreign shareholders. All shareholders should have the opportunities to obtain 
effective redress for violation of their rights. 
Principle 4: The role of stakeholders in corporate governance. Annotation:
 The corporate governance framework should 
recognize  the  rights  of  stakeholders  established  by  lawor through mutual 
agreements and encourage active co-operation between corporations and 
stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound 
enterprises. 
Principle 5: Disclosure and transparency. 
Annotation: The corporate governance framework  should ensure that timely 
and accurate disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the 
corporation, including the financial situation, performance, ownership, and 
governance of the company. 
Principle 6: The responsibilities of the board. 
Annotation: The corporate governance framework  should ensure the strategic 
guidance of the company, the effective monitoring of management by the 
board, and board’s accountability to the company and the shareholders. 
The main theme of the above principle lies in four basic principles. Firstly, the 
mechanism of business ethics, secondly the mechanism of decision making, thirdly 
in adequate disclosure and transparency and lastly the mechanism of book keeping 
and final accounts. These OECD principles are so sound that even the non-
members of OECD are implementing and adopting. 
The soundness of these  principles has been  proved by its adoption all over 
the world the next section will discuss the Islamic view of corporate government 
from the Islamic perspective. 
 
Researchers have defined corporate governance in a variety of ways, and the most 
widely cited definitions follow. The OECD defines CG as “a set of 
relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and 
other stakeholders. Corporate Governance also provides the structure through 
which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those 
objectives and monitoring performance are determined”. This definition provides 
important attributes of CG and emphasizes transparency. However, it does not 
directly deal with the intrinsic issue of the business objectives that should 
guide the distribution of rights and responsibilities within the corporation. Indeed, 
the objectives of a corporation’s founders’, whether these be the increase of 
shareholders’ value 
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or the pursuit of stakeholders’ interest, can be expected to affect such a distribution and 
shape the institutional structure and systems. In particular,the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among shareholders and other stakeholders would be driven by the 
interests of whoever establishes the corporation and subsequently controls it. 
 
 
 
The revised Principles emphasise the importance of a regulatory framework in corporate 
governance that promotes efficient markets, facilitates effective enforcement and clearly 
defines the responsibilities between different supervisory, regulatory and enforcement 
authorities. They also emphasise the need to ensure transparent lines of management 
responsibility within companies so as to make boards and management truly accountable. 
Other  issues  addressed  by  the  revised  Principles  include: 
 
 
Institutional investors 
• They should disclose their corporate governance policies, how they decide on the 
use of their voting rights and how they manage conflicts of interest that may 
compromise their voting; 
• Restrictions on consultations between shareholders about their voting intentions 
should be eased to reduce the cost of informed ownership. 
 
Shareholder rights 
• The rights of investors must be strengthened. Shareholders should be able to 
remove board members and participate effectively in the nomination and election 
processes; 
• They should be able to make their views known about executive and board 
remuneration policy and any equity component should be subject to their approval. 
 
Conflicts of interest and auditor responsibility 
• A new principle calls for rating agencies and analysts to avoid conflicts of interest 
which could compromise their advice; 
• The duties of the auditor must be strengthened and include accountability to 
shareholders and a duty to the company to exercise due professional care when 
conducting an audit; 
• Auditors should be wholly independent and not be compromised by other 
relations with the company. 
 
Stakeholder rights and whistle-blower protection 
• The Principles make reference to the rights of stakeholders, whether established 
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by law or through mutual agreements. 
• A new principle advocates protection for whistleblowers, including institutions 
through which their complaints or allegations can be addressed and provides for 
confidential access to a board member. 
 
Board responsibilities 
• The duties and responsibilities of the board have been clarified as fiduciary in 
nature, particularly important where company groups are concerned; 
• The principle covering board independence and objectivity has been extended to 
avoid conflicts of interest and to cover situations characterised by block and 
controlling shareholders, as well as the board's responsibility for oversight of 
internal control systems covering financial reporting. 
A concept of corporate governance from Islamic perspective does not differ much with 
the conventional definition as it refers to a system by which companies are directed and 
controlled with a purpose to meet the corporation’s objective by protecting all the 
stakeholders’ interest and right. Uniquely, in the context of corporate governance within 
the Islamic paradigm it presents distinct  characteristics  and  features  in  comparison  
with  the conventional system as it refers as a special case of a broader decision-making 
theory that uses the premise of Islamic socio- scientific epistemology which is premised 
on the divine oneness of God . A definition by the finance committee on corporate 
governance in Malaysia in the report on corporate governance stated that: 
Corporate governance is the process and structure used to direct and manage the 
business and affairs of the company towards enhancing business prosperity and corporate 
accountability with the ultimate objective of realizing long term shareholder value, whilst 
taking account the interests of other stakeholders. 
This indicates that corporate governance is not only applied to the shareholders but the 
other stakeholders as well. 
Corporate governance in Islamic finance necessitates Islamic financial institutions abiding 
by a set of rules called the Islamic law or Shari’a. The Shari’a governs the bank’s 
operations and transactions in accordance with Islamic principles derived from the Quran 
and Hadith. 
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Regulatory and Corporate Governance (CG) framework of Banks 
I. National CG Framework 
- Banking Sector Specific Laws/Codes/Guidelines 
- Stock Exchanges Listing Rules and Regulations 
- Listed Companies Regulatory Authorities Laws, Rules and Regulations 
 
 
II. Islamic Finance and Shari’a specific Codes & Standards 
- IFSB  Guiding  Principles  on  Shari’a  Governance  systems  for  Institutions  Offering  
Islamic Financial Services 2009 
- IFSB Guiding Principles on Conduct of Business for Institutions Offering Islamic 
Financial Services 2009 
- IFSB Guiding Principles On Corporate Governance For Institutions Offering Only 
Islamic Financial Services (Excluding Islamic Insurance (Takaful) Institutions And Islamic 
Mutual Funds) 2006 
- IFSB Guidance on Key Elements in the Supervisory Review Process of Institutions 
offering Islamic Financial Services (excluding Islamic Insurance (Takaful) Institutions and 
Islamic Mutual Funds) 2007 
- AAOIFI Accounting, Auditing & Governance Standards (for Islamic financial institutions) 
 
 
III. International Standards and Codes 
- The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
- Guidance by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision on Enhancing Corporate 
Governance for Banking Organisations 2006 
 
 
The above framework suggests the build-up of a corporate governance 
framework for IFIs. To ensure that a national or sector specific CG framework 
is consistent with international best practice, the framework should incorporate 
the OECD principles and the BIS Guidelines. 
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Comparison of  Islamic Corporate Governance Principles with OECD 
principles 
 
An attempt is made to bring a comparative position of Islamic principles 
of corporate governance with the revised principles of OECD. 
 
Principle number OECD principles and annotation Islamic principles 
 
Insuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework 
• Promotion of transparent 
and 
1 efficient markets with rule 
of law and division of 
responsibilities 
• Promotion of business within 
ethical framework of 
Shari‘a 
• Believes in profit and loss 
• Primacy of Justice and social 
welfare with social and spiritual 
obligations 
• Prohibition of interest 
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Principle number OECD principles and annotation Islamic principles 
 
The rights of shareholders and key ownership functions 
• Basic shareholder rights • Property as trust from God 
2 • Participation in Decision- 
making at the general 
meetings 
• Structures and arrangements 
markets for corporate control 
• Ownership rights by all 
shareholders including 
institutional shareholders 
• Consultative process 
between shareholders 
and institutional 
shareholders 
The equitable treatment of 
shareholders 
• Protection to minority and 
foreign 
shareholders 
• Sole Authority is God 
 
 
• Society as stakeholders 
 
 
• Accountability not only to 
stakeholders but also to God, the 
ultimate owner 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Just and fairness of value 
 
 
• Equitable distribution of wealth 
to all stakeholders and 
disadvantages members in the 
form of Zakat and Sadqa 
3 
• Social and individual welfare 
with both spiritual and moral 
obligation 
• Sensation of Equality 
 
The role of stakeholders in corporate governance 
• In creating wealth, jobs 
and 
sustainability of 
4 
financially sound 
enterprises Disclosure and 
transparency 
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• Islamic accountability to Falah and 
social welfare orientation 
 
 
• Haram/Halal dichotomy in transaction 
• Social & individual welfare 
from both spiritual and 
material 
• Consideration to whole community. 
• Matters regarding corporation • Accountability with Shari‘a compliance 
• Financial situation • Socio-economic objectives 
5 
related to  firms’ control and 
accountabilitytoallits 
stakeholders 
• Performance, 
ownership and 
governance 
 
 
 
The responsibilities of the 
board 
• Justice, equality, truthfulness 
transparency 
 
• Wider accountability with 
written as well as oral disclosure 
 
• Strategic guidance • Accountability not only to company or 
board or stakeholders but also to Allah 
6 
the 
ultimate authority who leads to 
welfare and success 
• Monitoring of management • Holistic and integrative guidance 
• Accountability to 
company and 
stakeholders 
• Negotiation and co-operation 
 
 
• Consultation and consensus 
seeking for each decision with 
related stakeholders 
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B. Corporate governance system around the world 
1. Anglo-Saxon corporate governance system 
The Anglo-Saxon system is taking by the main source of firm’s finance. Therefore, the main 
concentration of Anglo-Saxon corporate governance is the shareholder interest where the 
principle is applied by given the right to each shareholder to vote pursuant to that the law found 
to be protecting the  shareholder  against the  management where a shareholder can be 
found misusing the company money which might affect the shareholder  wealth. 
The composition of the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance system is one board of 
directors constituting of executives and non-executives. The executive directors are 
managers of the corporations; whereas the non-executive directors are representing the 
shareholders to monitor the manager in their day to day business. Both executive and non-
executives directors’ members are appointed and dismissed by general assembly of 
shareholders . 
 
2. Germanic corporate governance system 
The Germanic corporate governance system deals with the firm as an autonomous economic 
entity which may benefit to shareholders and stakeholders in the firm. Countries which 
implement this system use two board system consisting of a supervisory board and managing 
board. Supervisory board main duties are to appoint the managing dismiss managing 
board and to evaluate management performance. Germanic corporate governance system 
considers the bank as the main source of finance. Therefore, the bank  
has a significant voting right in shareholder’s assembly and also represents shareholders’ 
interest in a supervisory board. 
 
3. Latin corporate governance system 
The Latin corporate governance system is considered more flexible compared with 
previous systems. In a context of board of directors, Latin corporations have an option to select 
either one board as Anglo-Saxon system or two boards as in Germanic system, shareholders 
have more influence in the Latin system, i.e. in French legislation, shareholders can remove a 
director, which overrule on a share one vote system. 
 
4. Japanese corporate governance system 
The board of directors in Japanese system comprises a board of directors, an office of 
representative directors and an office of auditors. The president is the rarely the chairman of 
the board. Banks have high influence on the decision making of the management in the 
Japanese system. 
 
C. Shari‘a Governance in Islamic Finance 
Islamic financial institutions have the duty to ensure the compliance with shari‘a principles 
in all aspects of their products, instruments, operations, practices and management which 
will be achieved by the establishment of a proper shari‘a governance framework. Thus 
shari‘a supervision plays an essential role in the governance of Islamic financial institution 
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and forms part of the principal component of the shari‘a governance framework. One of 
the roles of the shari‘a supervisory board is to advise the Islamic financial instutions on shari‘a 
matters to ensure conformity with shari‘a  rule in its operations at all time, endorsing and 
validating relevant documentations pertaining to the products and services of the Islamic 
financial institutions. The ideal role of shari‘a supervision involve ex ante and ex post 
aspects of shari‘a governance and these include shari‘a pronouncement, supervision and 
review.In this aspect, the Sharia governance framework in Malaysia is based on the centralised 
model as compared to the decentralized being practiced in the GCC  countries. The centralized 
model is formed on the basis that the Central Bank itself has its own shari‘a  supervisory 
board called the shari‘a Advisory Board by virtue of section 51 of the Central Bank 
of Malaysia Act 2009 and all Islamic financial institutions are required to form their own 
shari‘a  committee which must comply with the rules set by the  shari‘a  Advisory 
Board of the Central Bank. The importance of shari‘a  supervision is derived 
from five different resources namely religious, social, economic, legal and governance. 
The religious position is derived from the ability of shari‘a scholars in understanding 
and interpreting shari‘a principles to others. The social power of the shari‘a supervision 
provides confidence to the stakeholders about the legitimacy of the transactions and activities 
of the Islamic financial institutions. The economic power of the shari‘a supervision can 
be seen from the fact that the profitability of an Islamic financial institution is dependent on 
the performance of shari‘a scholars. As far as legal power is concerned it is derived from a 
variety of sources including regulators of the respective countries. The hierarchical position 
of  shari‘a supervision under the shareholders of the Islamic  financial 
institutions emphasizes it supremacy over other governance organs thus giving them 
authority to set their internal policy including task, responsibilities and relations with other 
governance organs in the Islamic financial institutions. 
The shari‘a governance which refers to all the elements about the active role of the shari‘a 
board and compliance with shari‘a is fundamental to Islamic banks in particular and the 
implementation of shari‘a governance is encouraged by international institutions of 
regulations like Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institution 
(AAOIFI) and Islamic Financial Services BoardShari‘a board monitoring 
The SSB plays very important role in ensuring good shari‘a governance. The role of the SSB 
is to include advising board of directors on shari‘a matters to ensure that the operations 
comply with shari‘a principles at all time, endorsing and validating relevant documentations 
pertaining to the products and services, as well as the internal policies and manuals and 
marketing advertisements. 
Dynamic and good shari‘a governance is the very essence in the development of 
Islamic banking and finance sector in Malaysia. Good shari‘a governance guarantees the 
dynamicity of Islamic financial growth. 
The interest of stakeholders may extend beyond the financial interest to ethical, religious or 
other values when requiring good corporate governance. In Islamic banks shareholders and 
Islamic scholars requires the operation of services offered to be under shari‘a law otherwise it 
will be subject to process in no permission. Therefore, corporate governance through shari‘a 
operation is essential. 
Each Islamic bank or financial institution has in-house religious advisers, collectively known 
as SSB, as part of the internal governance structure of the institution, in some countries, 
authorities have created oversight arrangement, such as shari‘a board in Islamic banking 
departments within supervisory agencies. These usually operate in connection with private 
independent market agents familiar with Islamic finance. 
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SSB prerogatives lie  in five  main  areas: certification  of permissible financial instruments 
though fatwas (ex ante shari‘a audit), verification of transactions’ compliance with issued 
fatwa (ex post shari‘a audit) the calculation and payment of Zakat, disposal of non shari‘a 
payment compliant earning, advise to the distribution of income or expenses among 
the bank shareholders and investment account holders. Each SBB issues a report to 
certify the shari‘a compliance of all financial transactions. In addition to SSB, most Islamic 
financial institutions have established another internal shari‘a Review structure namely 
shari‘a Review units. These units are independent of other departments or are an integral 
part of the internal audit and control department. 
In recent years, the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) has developed three Guiding 
Principles to help strengthen governance structures and processes in various segments of 
the Islamic financial services industry (IFSI) in line with its mandate to promote soundness 
and stability of the Islamic financial system.It was noted that in all three projects, concerns 
over the roles and functions of the Shari`ah boards, which constitute part of the broader 
governance system, have been a recurring theme. This is crucial,considering that 
compliance with Shari`ah rules and principles is the raison d'être of the IFSI. In fact, other 
IFSB standards – such as those on risk management, capital adequacy and supervisory review 
process – also contain requirements and recommendations aimed at ensuring that an 
appropriate Shari`ah governance system is in place. 
Consequently, the IFSB Council, during its ninth meeting in Jeddah, approved the 
preparation of a set of Guiding Principles on the Shari`ah governance system, which is 
expected to: 
 
 
(a) complement other prudential standards issued by the IFSB by highlighting in more detail 
to the supervisory authorities in particular, and the industry’s other stakeholders in general, the 
components of a sound Shari`ah governance system, especially with regard to the competence, 
independence, confidentiality and consistency of Shari`ah boards; 
(b) facilitate better understanding of Shari`ah governance issues and how stakeholders 
should satisfy themselves that an appropriate and effective Shari`ah governance system is 
in place; 
(c) provide an enhanced degree of transparency in terms of issuance, and the audit/review 
process for compliance with Shari`ah rulings; and 
(d) provide greater harmonisation of the Shari`ah governance structures and procedures 
across jurisdictions, especially since there are increasing numbers of IIFS with cross-border 
operations. 
 
 
 
D. Definition and Scope of Shari'a Governance System 
 
 
The term “Shari'a Governance System”, despite being commonly used within the IFSI to 
refer to structures and processes adopted by stakeholders in the IFSI (from financial 
regulators to market players) to ensure compliance with Shari'a rules and principles, has not 
been properly defined in any of the existing standards. In the interests of clarity, this 
document shall adopt the following definition of “Shari'a Governance System” and the 
other key terminology: 
56  
  
“Shari'a Governance System” refers to the set of institutional and organisational 
arrangements through which an IIFS ensures that there is effective independent oversight of 
Shari'a compliance over each of the following structures and processes: 
(a) Issuance of relevant Shari'a pronouncements/resolutions “Shari'a 
pronouncements/resolutions” refers to a juristic opinion on any matter pertaining to 
Shari`ah issues in Islamic finance, given by the appropriately mandated Shari`ah board. In 
jurisdictions where there is a central authority such as the national Shari`ah board or Fatwa 
Council, that central authority has the power to issue such pronouncements/resolutions, 
resulting in the Shari`ah board at the IIFS usually focusing only on ensuring that the IIFS 
is compliant with the pronouncements/resolutions issued by the central authority.Once it 
is decided that a Shari`ah pronouncement/resolution should actually be implemented, it 
becomes a “Shari`ah ruling” (hukm al-Shar’i) with full legal effect that binds the IIFS.A 
Shari`ah pronouncement/resolution shall be issued only through appropriate due processes, 
which, amongst others, should involve rigorous deliberation among members of the 
Shari`ah  board  over  any  proposed  Shari`ah-compliant  products  or transactions that 
require a Shari'a endorsement, as well as detailed scrutiny of the legal contracts and 
other documents relevant to the products or transactions. 
(b) Dissemination of information on such shari'a pronouncements/resolutions to the 
operative personnel of the IIFS who monitor the day-to-day compliance with the shari'a 
pronouncements/resolutions vis-à-vis every level of operations and each transaction Such a 
task would normally be undertaken by a designated “internal Shari`ah compliance 
unit/department (ISCU)”, or at least a Shari`ah compliance officer who is part of the 
IIFS’s compliance team. The IIFS shall equip the ISCU with the appropriate compliance- 
monitoring skills and relevant knowledge of the shari'a – for example, by assembling a team 
of staff with the two different skill-sets. The IIFS should also ensure that the ISCU is 
separate and independent from the business units and departments. 
(c) An internal Shari`ah compliance review/audit for verifying that Shari`ah compliance 
has been satisfied,during which any incident of non-compliance will be recorded and 
reported, and as far as possible, addressed and rectified IFSB-3 sets out that Shari`ah 
pronouncements/ resolutions issued by the Shari`ah boards should be strictly adhered to. The 
internal Shari`ah review would therefore be assigned to someone adequately trained in 
Shari`ah compliance review/audit, so that he or she would have a competent grasp of the 
process. 
While  the  ISCU  is  part  of  the  IIFS’s  compliance  team,the  internal Shari`ah 
review/audit unit/department (ISRU) may be established to function in a similar manner 
to the IIFS’s internal audit team. The major difference is that while the internal auditor will 
usually report to the Audit Committee, the ISRU shall report to the Shari`ah board. 
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Where appropriate, the internal Shari`ah review/audit reports shall require or recommend 
the management of the IIFS to address and rectify any issues of Shari`ah compliance. 
(d) An annual Shari`ah compliance review/audit for verifying that the internal Shari`ah 
compliance review/audit has been appropriately carried out and its findings have been duly 
noted by the Shari`ah board The Shari`ah board who issued the Shari`ah 
pronouncements/resolutions can take charge of this process, having received feedback and 
reports from the ISRU. Alternatively, this task may be assigned to an appropriately 
competent external auditor or external shari'a firm. 
The shari'a board or shari'a advisory firm that carries out the shari'a compliance 
review/audit shall produce reports, indicating whether the IIFS has complied with shari'a 
requirements throughout the financial year. 
Where appropriate and if deemed necessary, there could be two sets of reports produced: a 
general statement of compliance that should be included in the annual report of the IIFS; 
and a more detailed account of compliance work undertaken addressed specifically to 
the supervisory authorities. 
 
 
E. shari‘a Governance Model from Regulatory Perspective 
 
shari‘a  governance system as defined by The IFSB Guiding Principles on Sharia Governance 
System in Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services (IFSB-10) refers to a set of 
institutional and organizational arrangements  to  oversee shari‘a compliance  
aspects  in  Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs). In this  regard,
 majority of IFIs have established their own shari‘a board and 
some of them even have set up a dedicated internal shari‘a review unit or department to 
support shari‘a board in performing its function. This indicates a positive development on 
the aspect of shari‘a governance system in IFIs. Looking at the different framework and 
style of   shari‘a   governance in various legal environment and diverse banking models. 
The existing framework of Islamic finance in various jurisdictions demonstrates diverse 
practices and models of shari‘a governance system. Some jurisdictions prefer greater  
involvement of regulatory authorities and some countries on the other hand favor otherwise. 
Until now, it is still debatable whether the former or the latter is more prevalent and 
appropriate for possible adoption. To illustrate these diverse approaches, this study identifies 
five shari‘a governance models in the context of regulatory perspective. 
 
5. Reactive Approach 
This model is more prevalent in non-Islamic legal environment countries such as 
United Kingdom and Turkey. Although several Islamic banking licenses have been 
issued to IFIs, the regulatory authority is silent upon the shari‘a governance framework. 
Like any other conventional banks, IFIs are required to comply with existing legislations 
and regulations. On top of that, IFIs have duty to make sure that all their business 
operation and products are shari‘a compliant. There is no specific legislation governing 
IFIs as well as any directive specifying shari‘a governance framework. At this point, 
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the regulators will only react and intervene the shari‘a governance matters if there is any 
significance issue involved which may affect the industry. For instance, the UK Financial 
Services Authority only concerns on the roles play by the shari‘a board of IFIs to be advisory 
and supervisory and not executive in nature. 
 
6. Passive Approach 
 
This model is exclusive to shari‘a governance model in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Authority 
Monetary Agency (SAMA) treats IFIs equal to their conventional counterparts. SAMA has 
yet to issue legislation pertaining to Islamic finance and guidelines on shari‘a governance 
system. There is no national shari‘a advisory board or any institutions to be the sole 
authoritative body in Islamic finance. The existing shari‘a governance system as practiced 
by IFIs in the Kingdom is a product of self initiative rather than regulatory requirement 
or  regulator’s direction. 
 
7. Minimalist Approach 
This model is mainly practiced by the GCC countries with the exception of Oman and 
Saudi Arabia. Unlike the reactive approach, the minimalist model allows slight intervention 
on the part of regulatory authorities. The regulatory authorities expect IFIs to have proper 
shari‘a governance system without specifying the requirements in details. There is no 
restriction on multiple appointments of the shari‘a board to seat in various institutions at 
one particular time. Some jurisdictions in the GCC countries such as Bahrain,  Dubai  and  
Qatar  favor  the    adoption  of  the  AAOIFI Governance Standards. The minimalist 
approach prefers the market  to develop its own shari‘a governance system rather than 
greater intervention on the part of regulators. 
8. Pro-Active Approach 
This model is favorable by Malaysian regulatory authority. The proponent of this model 
has strong faith in regulatory-based approach in strengthening shari‘a governance 
framework. With this motivation, Malaysian regulator initiates comprehensive shari‘a 
governance framework from regulatory and non-regulatory aspects. There are several laws 
were passed and amended by the parliament such as the Islamic Banking Act 1983, the 
Takaful Act 1984, the Banking and Financial Institutions Act 1984 and the Securities 
Commission Act 1993. The Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009 confirms the status of 
National shari‘a Advisory Council (SAC) to be the sole authoritative body in Islamic 
finance. Furthermore, the Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) has  issued the Guidelines on 
the Governance of shari‘a Committee for the Islamic Financial Institutions known as the 
BNM/GPS1. To complement this, the Securities Commission of Malaysia issued the 
Registration of shari‘a Advisers Guidelines 2009 which setting up the criteria for the 
registration of a shari‘a adviser in the capital market sector. 
 
9. Interventionist Approach. 
While passive approach is exclusive to Saudi Arabia, interventionist model is unique 
to shari‘a governance model in Pakistan. The interventionist model allows third party 
institution to make decision on shari‘a matters pertaining to Islamic finance. In the case   
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of Pakistan, the   shari‘a   Federal Court is the highest authority   in   matters   involving   
Islamic   finance  despite  of  the  establishment of shari‘a board at the State Bank of 
Pakistan level. 
 
Shareholders increasingly expect  companies  to adhere to strict standards of corporate 
governance. In essence, corporate governance is the system by which companies are 
directed and controlled and involves adopting structures and processes which incorporate the 
values of fairness, transparency and accountability. The practical objective of corporate 
governance is to put in place a system which will deliver a company’s business objectives, 
i.e. increasing shareholder value, whilst managing risk. Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) 
share the same practical and business objectives, but are subject to an additional layer of 
compliance with shari‘a rules and principles. An IFI does not only seek to make a profit, it 
seeks to make such profit in a socially responsible manner. 
The IFSB has recently released a number of exposure drafts providing ‘Guiding Principles’ 
specifically aimed at Islamic financial institutions. The aim is not thereby to establish an 
entirely new governance framework for the Islamic finance industry, but rather to build 
on and complement existing international standards and encourage institutions to view 
compliance as part of a general strengthening of good corporate governance culture. 
Principles of good business conduct are desirable in terms of protecting investor interests 
and enhancing the integrity of the institutions concerned. It is also a requirement under 
shari‘a that companies observe principles of ethical business conduct. Furthermore, the 
principles of certainty and transparency underpin the validity of a shari‘a compliant contract. 
 
Three recent exposure drafts, published in December 2008, offer ‘Guiding Principles’ on 
Conduct of Business for Institutions offering only Islamic Financial Services (Excluding 
Islamic Insurance (Takaful) Institutions and Islamic Mutual Funds) (the Guiding Principles 
on Conduct of Business), shari‘a Governance System and Governance for Islamic Insurance 
(Takaful) Operations (the exposure drafts). These exposure drafts build on existing 
corporate governance and other IFSB standards. This briefing focuses on the first two. 
The Guiding Principles on Conduct of Business adopt a principles-based rather than a purely 
rules-based approach. It is intended that the seven principles outlined in the exposure draft 
will form the basis of a code of business conduct which is observed by all IFIs, and which 
complements existing standards. 
Principle 1 
Honesty and Fairness - IFIs should treat all shareholders fairly and aspire to the highest 
standards of honesty and integrity in all their dealings with them. 
Principle 2 
Due Care and Diligence - IFIs should  exercise due care, skill and diligence in their 
dealings with all categories of investors. An IFI will be expected to carry out proper 
evaluations of risk in relation to any investment activity and undertake appropriate reviews 
of the process of obtaining shari‘a approval and of the shari‘a compliance of asset 
portfolios. 
Principle 3 
Capabilities - an IFI must ensure that its senior management, staff and representatives are 
capable of discharging their duties competently. In particular, it is expected that those 
parties will have an appropriate 
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understanding of shari‘a and this principle must be continually kept under review. 
Principle 4 
Information about Clients - an IFI must undertake “know your customer” checks to ensure 
that an investor’s business and the purpose of any financing are consistent with shari‘a 
rules and principles. 
Principle 5 
Information to Clients - reporting processes must be transparent and fair. An IFI must protect 
investors and potential investors by providing them with information that appropriately 
reflects the nature of its products and services, and the associated risks. 
Principle 6 
Conflicts of Interest and Duty - as far as possible, an IFI should avoid situations which 
create a conflict of interest. Where this cannot be avoided, the situation should be 
managed to ensure that all stakeholders are treated fairly and any issues are addressed in a 
transparent and open manner. 
Principle 7 
Shari‘a Compliance - an IFI must adopt and implement appropriate shari‘a governance 
systems in order to monitor its shari‘a compliance. Since shari‘a compliance is of paramount 
importance in the context of IFIs, this issue is addressed more fully in a separate exposure 
draft as set out below. 
 
Previous IFSB publications highlighted a particular concern over the role and function of 
shari‘a boards within the Islamic financial services industry. shari‘a boards play a key 
role in advising institutions on their compliance  with  shari‘a     rules  and  principles.  
Whilst  other  IFSB publications have contained recommendations for ensuring appropriate 
shari‘a governance systems are in place, the Guiding Principles on shari‘a Governance 
System were a response to the industry’s need for greater clarity in this fundamental area. 
‘Shari‘a Governance’ is defined as the set of institutional and organisational arrangements 
through which an IFI ensures that there is effective independent supervision of, in particular, 
the issue and dissemination of shari‘a pronouncements, and internal and external shari‘a 
compliance reviews. 
Principle 1 
General Approach - various different shari‘a governance structures have been adopted in 
different jurisdictions, and systems adopted should be proportionate to the size, complexity 
and nature of the business. shari‘a boards should have a clear mandate and be equipped 
with operative procedures and reporting lines to provide effective shari‘a governance. 
Principle 2 
Competence - the choice of the scholars and other individuals whose role is to provide 
shari‘a advice should be made on the basis of an individual’s honesty, good character and 
possession of the necessary qualifications to understand the technical requirements of the 
business. The need for ongoing professional development of such individuals is also 
crucial to ensure that they are kept up-to-date with legislative changes and industry-
specific knowledge. shari‘a boards should be regularly assessed in relation to objective 
performance criteria and be accountable to the board of directors. 
Principle 3 
Independence - no individual member of a shari‘a board should be ‘connected’  with  the  
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company  or  serve  another  function  within  the company. Each member should be capable 
of exercising independent judgement. The management of the IFI should ensure that all 
relevant information is supplied to the shari‘a board promptly and in such a manner that 
enables the board to discharge its duties properly. This will involve allowing the shari‘a 
board independent access to senior management and providing for any further enquiries that 
may be made. Principle 4 
Confidentiality - members of the shari‘a board will inevitably be exposed to commercially 
sensitive inside information in the discharge of their duties. As part of an IFI’s broader risk 
management processes therefore, it should ensure that adequate confidentiality clauses are 
included in each member’s service contract. There should also be an appropriate procedure 
for dealing with leaks of inside information, which may include some form of disciplinary 
action. 
Principle 5 
Consistency - decisions of shari‘a boards should be consistent and, as far as possible, follow 
the pronouncements of the central shari‘a authority in the relevant jurisdiction, where 
applicable. Where no such authority exists, it is recommended that the shari‘a board uses 
best efforts to conform to any previous rulings and to publish its decisions so that they may 
be openly and transparently assessed. 
The Islamic Financial Services Act 2013 
The rule relating to shari‘a governance is provided under section 30 until section 36 of IFSA 
2013 whereby the existence of these provisions highlighted the intention of the law 
maker, in focusing to the matters pertaining to appointment and qualification of the shari‘a 
Committees members in Islamic financial institution. Unlike the Central Bank of Malaysia 
Act 2009 which merely touched the surface of the matter by highlighting the general 
requirement for financial institution to have a shari‘a committee, the current provision 
provides a more specific requirement under section 30 of IFSA 2013 which requires an 
institution to apply directly to the Central Bank for the establishment of shari‘a 
Committee. This will enable the Central Bank to have direct information as to the members 
of the shari‘a Committee in an Islamic financial institution, which at the same time, 
to ensure a proper supervision towards the activities conducted. 
Another  major  point  being  made  available  under  the  new  shari‘a governance legal 
provision is the criteria of the members of shari‘a Committee. A clear
 standard of requirement pertaining to the 
appointment of such committee is highlighted under section 31 which is to be crossed 
referred with section section 29 (2) (a) which states only those who is really fit and 
qualified may be appointed as the shari‘a Committee members. This leads to the notion 
that members of shari‘a Committees in every financial institution must be chaired by those 
who met the requirements as stated by the Central Bank. 
Availability of such clause would be vital in ensuring the products and services introduced 
by the Islamic financial institution complied with the shari‘a principles via the supervision 
of competent members. 
Section 32 of IFSA 2013 contributes to the significance of shari‘a Committees in every 
institution through the introduction of the shari‘a governance which not only set out the 
duties of the shari‘a committees in the institution, but rather blend into the structure of the 
company itself. By extending the powers of shari‘a governance into certain aspects in a 
company such as matters involving the board of directors and internal shari‘a compliance, 
we can understand that shari‘a  governance would 
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be one of the integral parts in an institution up to the point that shari‘a comittee may no 
longer be treated as a minor part or division of a company, what more against the idea 
of abandoning such 
governance rules. 
The introduction of under section 33 and 34 of IFSA, on the other hand, enables the Central 
Bank to continuously be updated by the institution of its shari‘a Committee members. In order 
to maintain its aim of ensuring that only those who really qualifies entitled to be the 
members, the provision set out the clause relating to the cessation of the members 
including situations which would disqualifies from becoming shari‘a committee members. 
By setting out a more precise rules and features of the shari‘a committee members, the IFSA 
2013 under section 35 has made it compulsory for management in charge of the company 
to provide information to the shari‘a committee in exercising its task and duties. While the 
Act did not mention the type and degree of information required, it can be assumed that the 
shari‘a Committee is authorised to obtain regardless of any kind, if such information would 
assist them in carrying out their duties. 
In addition, section 36 marks the trust which has been given by the legislation over the 
shari‘a Committee to hold any type of information including the confidential ones provided 
such information is not being relayed to the other persons. While maintaining the duty of 
confidentiality, the shari‘a committees are also vested with the protection under the 
qualified privilege which prevents them from being taken a legal action by the Islamic 
financial institution, if it can be proven that such duties was conducted in good faith. 
The provision clauses as to the shari‘a governance is one of the major features being 
introduced under the IFSA 2013 which contributes to the  boost of authorities as well as 
roles of the shari‘a Committee,thus ensuring the activities of the Islamic financial 
institution to be under shari‘a compliance thus maintaining a sound and robust shari‘a 
governance framework in Islamic financial industry in Malaysia. 
 
IV. EFFECTIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
 
Corporate governance has gained great prominence over the last two decades even in the 
conventional financial system because of continued financial instability. It would be of even 
greater importance in the Islamic system because of the additional risk to which the depositors 
would get exposed when the banks really start moving into the risk-sharing modes. This poses 
an important challenge before Islamic banks to improve all crucial aspects of corporate 
governance. The challenge will become more serious as these institutions expand and 
their problems become more complex. This challenge could be successfully met if the Board 
of Directors and Senior Management become more effective in the performance of their 
responsibilities. 
 
For this purpose, it is important to sharpen the tools of corporate governance, the most 
important of which are: internal controls, risk management, transparency, loan accounting 
and disclosure, shari‘a clearance and audit, external audit, and prudential regulation and 
supervision. Total reliance on these would, however, not be sufficient. Moral commitment 
on the part of all market operators is indispensable. Without such commitment, market 
operators will find different ways of violating the law without getting detected and punished. 
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This will create 
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the need for more and more legal checks and controls, which will raise transactions costs to an 
unbearably high level. Making them truly accountable before shareholders and depositors by 
the adoption of measures discussed in this paper should also be of great help. What is also 
needed is the establishment of a number of shared institutions as discussed above. Without such 
institutions even banks with the best corporate governance may not be able to avoid crises. 
 
However, corporate governance is generally weak in all countries and particularly so in 
developing  countries, in  which category nearly all Muslim countries fall at present. This is 
because all the institutions that play a crucial role in disciplining markets and ensuring 
efficiency and integrity are not well-developed in these countries. Information asymmetries are 
more severe, market participants less experienced, and regulations, even if they exist, do not always 
get enforced effectively and impartially because of political corruption and the general weakness 
of judicial systems. Disclosures are also not adequate and accounting practices are not 
well developed. The adverse effects of ineffective corporate governance can be more 
serious in the case of financial institutions because their leverage is much higher, the number 
of their stakeholders is more extensive, and the systemic risks of their failure are far more serious. 
There is no reason to assume that, even though the Islamic financial institutions have done 
fairly well so far, they have necessarily been able to escape the trappings of the prevailing 
weak corporate governance in developing countries. It is, therefore, not possible to avoid the 
taking of all those measures that would help improve the functioning of these institutions. 
The role of the Board of Directors  and  Senior  Management  is  of  crucial  importance  in  
this  respect. It is gratifying to note that almost all Muslim countries are presently in the 
process of implementing the BCBS guidelines. 
 
A. The Board of Directors 
The Board of Directors cannot, however, play this role effectively if its members do not have  
a  high  degree  of moral  integrity as well  as professional competence in banking business. They 
must be adequately aware of the risks and complexities involved in the banking business. In an 
Islamic system, they must have the additional qualification of being well-versed in the shari‘a 
and its objectives and in particular the rationale behind the prohibition of interest. They should 
ensure adequate transparency in keeping with the standards laid down by the BCBS, the IFSB 
and the supervisory authority of their own country through a smooth flow of relevant information 
to directors, senior Management, auditors, supervisors, shareholders, depositors and the public 
according to the needs of each with a view to ensure a proper check on the affairs of the bank. 
They must establish  a strong internal control system, proper accounting procedures, effective 
internal and external audit, efficient risk management, and all necessary checks and balances, rules, 
regulations and procedures. 
 
Experience has shown that directors do not necessarily perform their roles effectively. There 
are a number of reasons for this. One of these is that the Board members may not necessarily 
have the professional competence and the moral integrity that are needed to manage the bank 
efficiently. Another reason is that Board members are not always genuinely elected by 
shareholders and are not necessarily accountable before them. Elections do not take place 
regularly at defined intervals and, even if they do, evidence  indicates that shareholders are  not 
actively involved in the election or removal of directors. This enables board members to 
perpetuate themselves and it is generally difficult to dislodge them except through takeovers. 
These are, however, expensive and potentially disruptive and, may not, therefore, be a possible 
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remedy except in extreme cases. To correct this situation, it is necessary to have a transparent 
procedure for elections and to adopt measures that would enable minority shareholders and 
investment depositors to have a say in Board decisions. It is also necessary to enable shareholders 
to remove Board members in the event of their performance falling far short of what they expect. 
It is, therefore, imperative to institute reforms in election procedures as well as proxy rules to 
enable shareholders to elect competent and conscientious persons to the Board of Directors and 
to prevent them from perpetuating themselves in spite of their poor performance. 
 
It is also necessary to develop a legal and regulatory infrastructure to protect the rights of not 
only minority shareholders but also depositors (both being outsiders). In a number of countries 
companies are allowed to ask registered shareholders, who are unable to attend general meetings, 
to transfer their votes to the Board of Directors. This further strengthens the hands of the Board 
and enables it to control decisions at shareholder meetings. Since the transfer of voting rights 
often leads to far-reaching consequences, which may not always be in the interest of all 
stakeholders, it would be desirable to transfer voting rights to shareholder associations, if they 
exist. If such associations do not exist, then voting rights may be transferred to supervisory 
authorities or to specialized chartered firms established in the private sector to protect  the 
interest of stakeholders against a fee as discussed later. All three of these institutions would 
perhaps be better qualified to protect the interests of stakeholders. 
 
It would also be helpful if there are an adequate number of non-executive directors on the Board. 
Empirical evidence in the conventional system indicates that non-executive directors influence 
positively a Board’s capabilities to evaluate and discipline managers. This is perhaps because 
such directors do not have any management responsibility and may not, therefore, have a vested 
interest in protecting the management. They may, therefore, be expected to attach greater weight 
to the interests of minority shareholders and depositors and, thereby, help inject equity into 
the company. If they do not come up to this expectation, they would hurt their own reputation 
in the directors’ labour market. Removal of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) caused by 
poor performance is more likely in outsider dominated Boards than in insider dominated ones. 
However, here too there are problems. If the non- executive directors have not been elected 
by shareholders but rather handpicked by the dominant shareholder or the CEO, they would 
owe their careers to him and would, therefore, ‘lack the information and incentives required 
to provide consistent effective corporate governance’. There will, thus, be conflict of interest, 
which will create a lack of willingness on their part to discipline senior management. Moreover, 
Board meetings may not be  frequent and  non-executive directors may not, therefore, be able 
to monitor the activities of the company effectively and ensure correction, particularly if overt 
criticism of management policies in board meetings is considered to be rude Since   Islamic   
banks   are   generally   small   compared   with   their conventional counterparts even in Muslim 
countries, leave alone the rest of the world, the amount of capital held by them is also very small. 
This enables concentration of shares in the hands of a few executive directors. The number of 
non-executive directors who can serve as a check on the executive directors is also accordingly 
small. Since the small size as well as the concentration of shareholdings carries the potential 
of leading to undesired consequences for protecting the interests of all stakeholders, it is 
desirable to enlarge the size of banks and to institute legal reforms with the objective of reducing 
concentration, diversifying risks, and increasing the ability of these banks to absorb losses. 
 
It would also be desirable to introduce some other reforms to make the Board of Directors more 
effective in its functions. One of these, which needs to be considered seriously, is to relate the 
66  
  
remuneration of Board members to their performance in the same way as required in mudaraba 
contracts. The directors in their capacity as mudaribs (managing entrepreneurs) should be 
compensated for only their actual expenses and not be entitled to a fixed management fee or 
remuneration as they do in modern corporations. Their remuneration should be a certain 
percent of the profit earned by the bank, if the bank makes a profit. This must be in addition to 
their normal share in profit like other shareholders on the basis of their shareholdings. The 
percentage share of profits to be allocated to the directors for their management services must be 
clearly specified in the Articles of Agreement so that it is well-known to the shareholders. 
If the corporation makes a profit, the directors get the specified percent of profit for their 
services. But if the corporation makes a  loss,  the  directors  do  not,  like  the  mudarib,  get  a 
‘fee’  for  their management services, and should share in the losses in proportion to their 
stockholdings. The directors would thus get a reward for their services only if they have 
contributed to profits – the higher the profit, the greater their reward. This should prove to be an 
incentive to them for better performance. 
 
B. Senior management 
While the Board of Directors refers to persons who are generally not only shareholders themselves 
but also participate in the governance of the bank, senior management refers to the CEO and 
other senior members of the staff who perform management functions but are not necessarily 
shareholders. Modern corporations are in general not managed by their owners (shareholders). 
Instead, professional managers are hired to run the business. They are ‘fiduciaries’.1 This 
creates the principal/agent problem and leads to a conflict of interests. It is, therefore, necessary 
to impose restrictions on self-dealing, fraud, excessive compensation in different hidden forms, 
and other malpractices. 
 
One of the  most important constraints on  management is that key positions should not be 
held by one person (‘four eyes principle’). Since the CEO and the Chairman of the Board perform 
two distinct functions in the bank, it would be preferable to have two different persons holding 
these positions so that there is a clear division of responsibilities at the top of the bank to 
ensure independence and balance of power and authority. Neither the directors nor the 
management should be allowed to stay on the job if they are no longer competent or qualified to 
run the bank. As argued by Jensen and Ruback, poor managers who resist being replaced 
might be the costliest manifestation of the agency problem. 
It is the responsibility of the Board of Directors and senior management to ensure proper internal 
controls, and effective management of all risks, including credit risk, liquidity risk, interest-rate 
risk, and operational risks. Even though the exposure of most Islamic banks to these risks seems to 
be relatively high, they have been able to manage them fairly well so far. Nevertheless, this may 
not necessarily continue in the future. It is, therefore, extremely important to cultivate an 
effective risk management culture in these banks to ensure their competitiveness and survival in 
a world full of uncertainties and crises. This cannot, however, be done without the active 
collaboration of Board of Directors, senior management, the shari‘a scholars, and bank 
supervisors. 
C. Regulatory and Internal Frameworks 
 
 
 
1. Proactive Approach and Integrated Corporate and Sharī'ah 
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Governance 
 
 
In view of the numerous challenges faced by Islamic finance, it is recommended that the 
industry needs a regulatory-based approach framework as explained before. As a prerequisite, 
Sharī'ah governance must be part of the concerns of regulators and policymakers. The 
regulators should proactively monitor the implementation of Sharī'ah governance and learn 
from the experience of other jurisdictions in nurturing the Sharī'ah governance framework. The   
principle   of   ‘one-size-fits-all’   Sharī'ah   governance   is   not appropriate as the market 
and local legal environments are different 
from one place to another.In designing the Sharī'ah governance framework, it is a matter of 
necessity to have an integrated corporate and Sharī'ah governance framework. These two 
things must not be segregated as they complement each other. In this aspect, the principles or 
guidelines on corporate governance must take into account the element of Sharī'ah governance 
when it involves institutions offering Islamic financial services. This is important because the 
stakeholder-oriented model of governance in IFIs requires them to protect the rights and 
interests of all stakeholders. 
 
2. Supervision and Enforcement 
 
 
The regulators should have a comprehensive framework in the aspects of supervision and 
enforcement and these include written guidelines on supervision for supervisors, directives for 
IFIs issued by supervisors, sufficient resources with adequate knowledge on Sharī'ah 
governance-related matters and full authority to carry out the enforcement functions.  The 
supervisors should provide guidelines and make sure that they evaluate the internal policies 
and procedures as well as the implementation of these procedures. It is also important for 
the supervisors to consistently inspect the IFIs by having a proper framework in place which 
allows them to make an assessment of  IFIs’  shari‘a  governance policies and tools to redress 
any  deficiencies. 
 
 
3. Dispute Settlement 
 
 
It would be an ideal development if the regulators initiated a special bench for Islamic 
finance cases as part of the court’s structure. In this special bench, the court may appoint 
judges who are knowledgeable in Islamic finance or the regulators may allocate a certain amount 
of funds to provide training for those judges. On top of that, a reliable shari‘a litigation system 
must also be in place. It is understood that in a secular legal environment, such as in the UK, 
the above arrangement is slightly difficult to implement. Therefore, it is important for the 
regulators in the secular legal environment to consider a court referral to a s h a r i ‘ a board or 
a s h a r i ‘ a  expert  to determine cases involving s h a r i ‘ a issues. Alternatively, a special 
tribunal for Islamic finance cases may be established to handle  disputes involving IFIs in this 
kind of jurisdiction. 
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The policymakers should also take into account other legal avenues for dispute settlement, such 
as arbitration and mediation.  At  this point in time, there are several institutions for international 
dispute resolution, such as the Dubai Centre for Arbitration and Conciliation, the GCC 
Commercial Arbitration Centre, the Bahrain Centre for International Commercial Arbitration 
Centre, the International Chamber of Commerce’s International Court of Arbitration, the 
London  Court  of  International  Arbitration,  the  Kuwait  Centre  for 
Commercial Arbitration, the Kuala Lumpur Arbitration Centre and others. In view of these 
numerous arbitration centres, it is recommended that there should be one specific institution that 
offers alternative dispute resolutions and settlement for Islamic finance cases. Alternatively, the 
existing arbitration centres should develop and enhance their expertise and capabilities in 
Islamic finance in terms of resources, frameworks, procedures and facilities. At this point, 
these institutions for arbitration must prepare to facilitate themselves with necessary facilities and 
resources to address the need for dispute settlement involving Islamic finance cases. 
 
 
In order to ensure the effectiveness of the arbitration, the decision or solution of the arbitration 
should be made binding and conclusive. The legally binding effect in arbitration is crucial for the 
purpose of ensuring credibility and confidence in any solution made in the arbitration. In spite 
of that, it is also important for the regulators to encourage arbitration as an alternative legal avenue 
for dispute settlement and to issue policies and procedures that clearly acknowledge Islamic law 
as the main source of law as a basis for decision-making. 
 
 
 
4. Well-conceived By-laws and Internal Policies 
 
 
Well-conceived by-laws and internal policies are prerequisites of effective shari‘a governance. 
Realizing this, the IFIs should have appropriate by-laws and policies as guidelines for their 
internal use in terms of meeting  procedures, decision-making, preparing reports and 
dissemination of information, records and reviews. At this point, the IFSB-10 and the AAOIFI 
governance standards may be the basis for such by-laws, with some modifications that would 
be appropriate to be  implemented within the local market and regulatory environment. 
 
 
D. Attributes of the shari‘a Board on Independence 
 
 
1. Method of Appointment 
There are significant differences in the method of appointment of the shari‘a board between 
IFIs. It is also found that numerous IFIs did not comply with the AAOIFI governance standards 
in that their appointments are made by the BOD and not the shareholders. In view of the actual 
market practice and more practical tools for ensuring independence, There are other 
mechanisms that would be appropriate to achieve such an objective. Firstly, the appointment 
must be made either by the BOD or the shareholders. Secondly, the appointment must be 
subject to the approval of the regulatory authorities. Thirdly, the appointment must not be 
permanent but rather contractual subject to renewal. Fourthly, the termination and dismissal 
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must also be subject to the approval of the regulatory authorities. 
 
 
2. Code of Conduct 
 
 
 
The majority of IFIs do not have a code of ethics for shari‘a board. The existing practices seem 
to presume that shari‘a board members are bound by Islamic ethical principles. In view of the 
need to have a certain and precise code of ethics specific and exclusive to the shari‘a board, the 
regulatory authorities as well as the IFIs may prescribe certain acceptable behaviour for 
shari‘a board members. It is incumbent upon the IFIs to initiate and develop an internal code of 
conduct for the shari‘a board. This code of ethics should be enforceable and there must be a 
mechanism within the organizational structure to ensure its strict implementation. Breach of 
this code of ethics may incur disciplinary action such as suspension, termination or other kinds 
of sanctions. 
 
 
3. Professional Body 
 
 
 
There is no professional body specifically established to set a standard practice for the shari‘a 
board as is the case for other professionals such as lawyers, accountants, medical practitioners 
and engineers. The establishment of a professional body to set the qualifications of the 
shari‘a board, to introduce a standard code of conduct, to develop a training programme and 
to enhance the professionalism of the shari‘a board is consider necessary at this point in 
time. At the moment, different bodies attempt to provide qualification programmes for shari‘a 
boards, such as the AAOIFI Certified shari‘a Adviser and Auditor, the Scholar Development 
Program initiated by the IFC Islamic finance council and the SII and the IBFIM shari‘a 
Scholars Introduction Program, but it was found that such qualifications have not been accepted 
universally. The study strongly recommends the establishment of The Association of  Shari`a 
Advisors at the national and international levels.235 With this association, the quality of 
the shari‘a board can then also be rated by an independent agency similar to a credit-rating 
agency. 
 
 
4. Remuneration Policy 
 
 
There are significant differences in the remuneration of different shari‘a boards. The absence 
of any policy limitation or guidelines on the shari‘a board’s remuneration may lead to unhealthy 
practices. The top ten shari‘a scholars who dominated the board positions in IFIs around the world 
earn a very lucrative and significant amount of remuneration. It was found that a chairman of 
a shari‘a board could earn USD50,000 to USD100,000 per board and a top scholar could 
even gain up to USD250,000 on a typical capital markets deal. This study further estimates 
that the top five shari‘a scholars may earn up to a million dollars per year for servicing more than 
a hundred board and chairman positions around the world. While there is no standard benchmark 
or scale fee for shari‘a advisors, the regulators as well as the IFIs should establish a specific policy 
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for the remuneration of shari‘a board members based on the appropriate scale fees. In the context 
of the internal policy of IFIs, the shari‘a board scale fees should be approved by the shareholders 
and disclosed in the annual report. 
 
 
5. Attributes of the shari‘a Board on Confidentiality 
 
There were shari‘a scholars who have unintentionally or indirectly disclosed some confidential 
information, particularly those sitting on the boards of numerous IFIs. In addition, the survey 
results indicated that 29% of IFIs view that the shari‘a board is not fully aware of the issue 
of confidentiality. Realizing this, the IFIs should have a proper mechanism to resolve this 
issue and this includes terms of reference in the letter of appointment, enforcement of the 
code of ethics and disciplinary proceedings for any misconduct by the shari‘a board. In 
defining the scope of confidentiality, a reference may be made to section 52 of the IFSB-10. 
The IFSB-10 nevertheless does not provide guidelines for disciplinary proceedings in the event 
that shari‘a board members breach confidentiality or disclose sensitive or confidential 
information. As such, the IFIs are recommended to have proper disciplinary proceedings, such 
as hearing procedures, and rules of evidence with an appropriate organizational structure. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
 
Bay` 
 
 
Sale or contract of sale. 
Bay` al-`Inah A contract involving the sale and buy-back transaction of assets 
by a seller. A seller sells an asset to a buyer on a cash basis and 
later buys it back on a deferred payment basis where the price is 
higher than the cash price. It can also be applied when a seller 
sells an asset to a buyer on a deferred basis and later buys it 
back on a cash basis, at a price which is lower than the deferred 
Commodity Murābahah A Murābahah-based purchase and sale transaction of Sharī`ah- 
compliant commodities, whereby the buyer purchases the 
commodities on a deferred payment basis and subsequently sells 
them to a third party on a cash payment basis. 
Darūrah Darūrah is an exigency in the event that if the necessary act is 
not done, then it shall lead to the destruction of five fundamental 
needs, namely religion, life, intelligence, progeny and property. 
The principle of Darūrah is only applicable in exceptional 
circumstances where the avoidance of the specific necessary act 
shall ruin the said fundamentals. 
Fatawa (singular Fatwa) A juristic opinion or pronouncement of facts given by the 
Sharī`ah board, a Mufti, or a Faqīh on any matter pertinent to 
Sharī`ah issues, based on the appropriate methodology. 
Gharar Deceptive uncertainty where details concerning the sale contract 
are unknown or uncertain. 
I`ādat Al Shirā’ Repurchase 
Ijārah An Ijārah contract is an agreement made by an institution 
offering Islamic financial services to lease to a customer an asset 
specified by the customer for an agreed period against specified 
instalments of lease rental. An Ijārah contract commences with 
a promise to lease that is binding on the part of the potential 
lessee prior to entering the Ijārah contract. 
Istisnā` An Istisnā` contract is an agreement to sell to a customer a non- 
existent asset, which is to be manufactured or built according to 
the buyer‟s specifications and is to be delivered on a specified 
future date at a pre-determined selling price. 
Kafālah Guarantee 
Kafālah bi al-Ujr Charging fee for guarantee 
Maslahah Public interest 
Maysir Gambling 
Mu`addal Ribh Mutaghayyar Floating rate 
Mu`addal Ribh Thābit Fixed rate 
Mubādalah Swap 
Mubādalah al-Arba`ah Profit rate swaps 
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Muḍārabah A Muḍārabah contract is an agreement between the capital 
provider and a skilled entrepreneur whereby the capital provider 
will contribute capital to an enterprise or activity, which is to be 
managed by the entrepreneur as the Muḍārib. Profits generated 
by that enterprise or activity are shared in accordance with the 
terms of the Muḍārabah agreement, whilst losses are to borne 
solely by the capital provider unless the losses are due to the 
Muḍārib’s misconduct, negligence or breach of contracted 
terms. 
Muḍārib Labour provider 
Murābahah A Murābahah contract is an agreement whereby the institution 
offering Islamic financial services sells to a customer a 
specified kind of asset that is already in their possession at cost 
plus an agreed profit margin (selling price). 
Mushārakah A Mushārakah contract is an agreement between the institution 
offering Islamic financial services and a customer to contribute 
capital to an enterprise, whether existing or new, or to own a 
real estate or moveable asset, either on a temporary or 
permanent basis. Profits generated by that enterprise or real 
estate/asset are shared in accordance with the terms of the 
Mushārakah agreement, whilst  losses are shared in proportion 
to each partner‟s share of capital. 
Muslim A believer in or adherent of Islam. 
Qarḍ / Qarḍ al-Hasan A non-interest bearing loan intended to allow the borrower to 
use the loaned funds for a period with the understanding that the 
same amount of the loaned funds would be repaid at the end of 
the period. 
Rahn A contract to pledge a specified asset as security against a debt 
whereby the creditor (Murtahin) is entitled to hold custody of 
the asset. In the event of default by the debtor (Rāhin), the 
creditor may sell the asset. 
ReTakāful Islamic re-insurance 
Riba Usury 
Sadaqah (plural Sadaqāt) Donation 
Salam A Salam contract is an agreement to purchase, at a pre-
determined price, a specified kind of commodity not available 
with the seller, which is to be delivered on a specified future 
date in a specified quantity and quality. The institution offering 
Islamic financial services, as the buyer, makes full payment of 
the purchase price upon execution of a Salam contract. The 
commodity may or may not be traded over the counter or on an 
exchange  
Sharī`ah Divine Islamic law that encompasses all aspects of human 
life as revealed in the Qur'an and the Sunnah. 
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Sukūk (singular Sakk) Sukūk (certificates) each of which represents the holder‟s 
proportionate ownership in an undivided part of an underlying 
asset where the holder assumes all rights and obligations to 
such an asset. 
Tabarru’ Grant of property by a person with complete legal capacity 
without any compensation. In the context of Takāful 
operations, Tabarru’ is the amount of contribution to be 
relinquished by the Takāful participant as a donation for 
fulfilling the obligation of mutual help and to be used to pay 
claims submitted by eligible claimants. 
Tahawwut Hedging 
Takāful Takāful is derived from an Arabic word which means solidarity, 
whereby a group of participants agree among themselves to 
support one another jointly against a specified loss. In a Takāful 
arrangement, the participants contribute a sum of money as 
Tabarru’ (donation) into a common fund, which will be used for 
the mutual assistance of the members against specified loss or 
damage. 
Tawarruq Purchasing an asset with deferred price, either on the basis of 
Musawamah (sale contract without the disclosure of the asset 
cost price and profit margin to the buyer) or Murābahah, then 
selling it to a third party to obtain cash. 
Wa`d A promise to perform certain action(s) in the future. 
Wakālah An agency contract where the customer (principal) appoints 
the institution offering Islamic financial services as an agent 
(Wakīl) to carry out business on their behalf. 
Waqf (plural Awqāf) A property that produces income and that may have been 
deeded to benefit a community. 
Zakat Alms giving 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Key Players in Corporate Governance (CG) of Islamic 
Financial  Institutions (IFIs) 
 
Environment Important Issues Objectives/ Responsibilities in CG 
Government 
(Laws and 
Regulations 
for IFIs) 
Laws facilitating operations 
of Islamic financial 
institutions 
Provide clear laws and 
regulations that cater to the 
needs of IFIs. 
Accounting System Accounting and Audit 
standards for clear and 
transparent communication 
of information 
Provide uniform, clear and 
transparent accounting 
standards 
Public Institutions   
Supervisors Stability and soundness of 
the financial system 
(eliminate systemic risk) 
Develop internal controls, 
risk management procedures, 
and standards of 
transparency 
Provide Guidelines for FIs 
Monitor overall operations in 
general and risky behavior in 
particular 
Banking 
Associations 
Provide minimum standards 
of CG 
Set Principles and Sound 
practices 
Institutional   
Shareholders Shareholder Rights Elect board members 
 Share in profit  
Board of Directors Ensure good management 
team 
Oversight of management 
Protect shareholders and 
investment depositors rights 
Set overall policy and 
strategy 
Accountability of the 
management 
Senior Management Operate the institution 
efficiently. 
Right balance between risk 
and return 
Efficient incentive-structure 
Implement the policies set by 
the board in a sound and 
responsible manner 
 
  
Internal Audit Quality and quantity of 
information 
Transparency of information 
Ensure that the policies set by 
Board are followed by the 
management (Compliance) 
Employees Skills and work ethics 
Right incentive-structure 
Meet the goals set by the 
management 
Minimize operational risks 
Shari`a Boards Set shari‘a related rules and 
principles 
Oversee compliance with its 
verdict 
Others   
Depositors Good service 
Comparable returns 
Act responsibly 
Monitor the performance 
External Auditors Quality and quantity of 
information 
Transparency of information 
Evaluate the accuracy of the 
quality and quantity of 
information 
Shari`a Audit Adherence to the Shari`a Ensure compliance with the 
Shari`a Board verdicts. 
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Figure 3:   Key Players in Corporate Governance of Islamic Financial Institutions 
 
 
6.  Indicates the link 
exists Indicates the link 
does not exist or 
Environment 
(Economic System, Laws & Regulations, Legal System, Accounting System, etc.) 
 
Regulators/ 
Supervisors 
Shareholders 
ancia 
Board of 
Directors 
Deposit 
Insuranc 
Internal Audit  
Board 
on 
Depositors 
External 
 
Audut 
Customers 
(User of Funds) Employees 
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